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PREFACE
This report was prepared by the Douglas Aircraft Company, McDonnell Douglas Corporation,
Long Beach, California, under contract NAS2-10583. It is the final technical report covering the
review of accidents involving postcrash fire, the association between crash characteristics and
fire injuries, the identification of typical postcrash fire scenarios, fire safety concepts and their
cost and benefit parameters. This work was conducted between April 15, 1980 and February 28,
1981.
This study is the first of a two-phase study program to formulate a hazard analysis capability by
which concepts or systems for improvement of postcrash fire safety may be assessed for integra-
tion into a given commercial aircraft system.
The following Douglas personnel were the principal contributors to the study:
A. Cominsky
F. Duskin
T. Peacock
M. Platte
Principal Investigator
Interiors Engineering
Power Plant Engineering
Systems Analysis
The project was sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
Ames Research Center. Dr. Demetrius Kourtides was the project engineer for NASA.
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SECTION 1
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This is the final report for the Phase I portion of the Postcrash Fire Study. The total data base
consists of 80 accidents of predominantly jet aircraft flown by domestic airlines Of these 80 ac-
cidents, only 33 are sufficiently well documented for detailed study leading directly to general-
ized postcrash fire scenarios. Several approach, landing, and takeoff scenarios are developed
herein, but more work in this area is recommended.
The development and study of safety concepts are the main purpose of this program. Of the 20
concepts suggested and listed in this report, three have been developed in sufficient detail so
that operating and acquisition costs could be estimated. These safety concepts are:
C 2 - Improved fire-resistant seat material
P2 -- Anti-misting kerosene {AMKI
S l -- Additional cabin emergency exits
Effectiveness estimates were performed for Concepts C2 and P2 and two variations of Concept
$1. These estimates are summarized in the latter pages of Section 6.
It is clear that more study is required in the areas of those concepts which thus far have not
received the attention they deserve. This would provide increased variety in concept design,
cost, and effectiveness, and result in a more thorough concept comparison.

SECTION 2
INTRODUCTION
The United States is a leader in the design and production of large commercial aircraft. The air-
craft produced by the aircraft industry have been improved continuously because of the in-
dustry's concern for reliability and safety. Government regulatory and research activities share
in the interest of improved services and increased safety for the public.
Although the fire-safety record in commercial transport aircraft has been continuously
improved, aircraft fires still occur.
Recently improved materials placed in use by the aircraft industry represent a step forward in
fire-retardant characteristics. Generalized fire scenarios are needed for analysis and develop-
ment of fire prevention and control. Reliable risk assessment methods should also be developed
and systematically applied.
This program is part of a complete study to formulate a hazard analysis capability by which con-
cepts or systems for the improvement of postcrash fire safety may be assessed for integration
into a given aircraft system.
In this initial phase (Phase I), the current crash fire problem was characterized to the extent
possible by available data. Concepts for improving crash fire safety were defined, and some were
evaluated by reviewing their benefit and cost parameters.
Phase I will form the data base for the subsequent activities of establishing the threat response
and defining the merit function.
This report contains the results of the Phase I study of the postcrash fires. This study consisted
of three tasks:
Task 1 -- Definition of the Crash Fire Problem
Task 2 -- Crash Fire Safety Concepts
Task 3 -- Concept Characterization
For Task 1, a survey was made of impact-survivable postcrash fire accidents. The data base in-
cluded foreign and domestic accidents involving airlines and jet aircraft. However, the emphasis
was placed on domestic accidents, airlines, and jet aircraft due principally to availability of infor-
mation. This study covered only transport category aircraft in commercial service designed
under FAR Part 25.
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The relationships between the accident characteristics and the fire fatalities are shown in a
matrix (Appendix C} which tends to reveal the severity of each characteristic. Some typical
postcrash fire scenarios have been identified.
The Task 2 study produced 20 safety concepts related to areas of the aircraft as follows:
Five to the cabin interior
Four to the fuel system and power plant
Eleven to the primary structure.
The parameters to be used for concept evaluation were identified as belonging to three basic
categories:
1. Cost
2. Effectiveness
3. Societal Concerns.
The Task 3 effort consisted of a characterization study of three concepts:
1. Improved fire-resistant passenger seats
2. Anti-misting kerosene (AMK)
3. Additional cabin emergency exits.
SECTION 3
DEFINITION OF CRASH FIRE PROBLEM
This task consisted of reviewing accounts of aircraft accidents of the past 20 years and forming a
data base of fire-related accidents. Aircraft fires can be divided into three categories:
1. Ramp fires
2. Inflight fires
3. Postcrash fires
The postcrash fire, usually resulting from impact-survivable crashes of commercial passenger,
cargo, and training flights, is the only fire category considered in this study.
An impact-survivable accident is defined in this study as an accident in which all occupants did
not receive fatal injuries as a result of impact forces imposed during the crash sequence. An acci-
dent is classified as a fatal accident if one or more occupants received fatal injuries. Substantial
damage is damage _vhich adversely affects the structural strength, performance, or flight
characteristics of the aircraft and which would normally require replacement or major repair
unless the accident results in destruction of the aircraft. Accidents and incidents resulting in
nonsurvivable impact and minor or no damage were not considered in the crashworthiness
analysis.
The data base given in Appendix A primarily involved Boeing, Convair, Douglas, and Lockheed
aircraft models B747, B737, B727, B707, C880, C990, DC-10, DC-9, DC-8 and L-1011. The data
base reviewed was as large as practical since scenarios have maximum utility if they represent
accidents having a high probability of causing a significant portion of the annual lives lost from
fire.
Sufficient crash and fire data required for developing fire scenarios were discovered for only 33
of the 80 accidents of the data base (Ref. Tables A-l, A-2, and A-3). These 33 accidents are listed
in Table 1.
ACCIDENT DATA BASE
Altogether, 80 substantial damage accidents are included in this survey. This total consists of 46
accidents experienced by U.S. operators on or near U.S. airports; 10 accidents by U.S.
operators at airports outside the U.S.; 3 accidents by foreign operators at U.S. airports; and 21
accidents by foreign operators outside the U.S.
TABLE 1
SCENARIO CANDIDATE ACCIDENTS
FLIGHT MODE
APPROACH LANDING TAKEOFF
1-1
1-2
1-6
1-15
1-16
1-18
1-21
1-22
1-23
1-24
1-25
2-1
2-17
2-18
2-19
2-21
2-24
2-25
2-26
3-1
3-3
3-7
3-8
3-9
3-12
3-14
3-17
3-18
3-19
3-21
3-23
3-27
3-28
The accidents of this data base are presented in three groups where each group pertains to the
flight mode preceding the crash. These groups are:
1. Approach
2. Landing
3. Takeoff
Approach accidents occur while the aircraft is descending on approach before reaching the air-
port. This flight mode is generally characterized by flight along or near the glide slope with
approach speed, power, flaps, and gross weight with landing gear down. Impact can be with
trees, level or sloping ground, ditch, embankment, dike, water, vehicles, buildings or light sup-
port structures. These accidents are numbered 1-1 to 1-27 in Table A-1 of Appendix A.
Landing accidents occur when the aircraft touches down on or near the runway, and overruns or
veers off the runway after touchdown. This flight mode is characterized by flared-out flight with
landing speed, power, flaps, and gross weight with landing gear down. These accidents are
numbered 2-1 to 2-27 in Table A-2 of Appendix A.
Takeoff accidents occur while the aircraft is moving on the runway for takeoff or after liftoff
prior to retracting the landin_ gear and flaps. A tire or engine failure usually occurs. The wheel
or engine braking action is thus reduced and asymmetrical, and the aircraft overruns the airport
runway. These accidents are numbered 3-1 to 3-25 in Table A-3 of Appendix A.
Sometaxiing and parking accidents produce aircraft damage. However, resulting injuries and
fire damage are insubstantial. These accident types will not be studied.
Some totals and subtotals of all the injuries for the 80 accidents of Appendix A which form the
data base for this study are presented in Table 2. Here are found totals per accident group (ap-
proach, landing, and takeoff) as well as totals for airplane size groups (small, medium, and
large).
Aircraft Grouped by Size:
Small - B737, CV-580, CV-640, DC-9, FH-227, and L-382
Medium - B707, B727, B720, CL-44, CV-880, CV-990, DC-8, L-188
Large - B747, DC-10, L-1011.
A comparison among these size and flight mode groups is given on the basis of:
1. Injuries per accident
2. Percentage of total injuries.
Some conclusions that can be drawn from the values of Table 2 are:
o Approach accidents resulted in the largest number of fatalities (1041) or 46 percent of all
fatalities, whereas takeoff accidents produced the largest number of fire fatalities (505/.
2. Approach accidents produced the largest number of fatalities (39) per accident, whereas
takeoff accidents produced most fire fatalities (20) per accident.
3. The statistical prominence of fire deaths among takeoff accidents is due entirely to the
Tenerife double accident, which claimed a total of 390 fire deaths.
° Medium-sized aircraft have produced the greatest number of fire fatalities for approach and
landing accidents (19 and 14 respectively). Large-sized aircraft have produced the greatest
numbers of fire fatalities during takeoff (78) due again to the Teneriie accident.
FIRE DYNAMICS DATA BASE
The accident data base given in Appendix A has been reviewed to extract a list of fire accidents
which have substantial fire, injuries, and fire damage. Detailed descriptions of these accidents
have also been studied. With a serious accident, these characteristics are generally present.
There are 33 accidents with descriptions adequate to become candidates for scenario develop-
ment, listed in Table 1. The principal source of these data was the NTSB blue books.
O0 _ O0 "
_0_ _ _0 _
The descriptions of the candidate accidents are given in Appendix B. The descriptions of each of
the l 1 approach and 8 landing accidents are in the form of fire scenarios. These are a set of
chronologically arranged events starting from the flight mode just prior to the accident and
ending when the fire is extinguished.
Descriptions of the candidate takeoff accidents are presented in six paragraphs of Appendix B,
each of which contains information according to headings given on the first page of the Appen-
dix.
CRASH CHARACTERISTICS AND ASSOCIATED INJURIES
The accident scenarios and fire dynamics descriptions assembled in Appendix B were used to
determine a relationship between crash characteristics and associated injuries. For this purpose,
a matrix was prepared for each of the three accident categories: approach, landing, and takeoff.
Each row of the matrix represents an accident with about 35 crash characteristics entered in the
matrix columns.
An estimate of the numbers of fire fatalities attributed to the significant crash characteristics is
presented in the bottom four rows of each matrix. These rows provide some indication of the
seriousness of each characteristic.
The accident characteristics are placed in columns in the matrices located in Appendix C. These
columns are assembled into seven groups which are discussed and listed in the preamble to
Appendix C.
The matrix of approach accidents, with 11 events recorded, is presented in Table C-1. The most
serious structural failure appears to be the "ruptured wing tank" with a rating of 40 fire fatalities
per accident. The most common structural failure is shown in the "landing gear separated" col-
umn where 9 occurrences are recorded, resulting in a rating of 28.4 fire fatalities per accident.
The most dangerous terrain consists of trees and dikes or walls. This kind of terrain is rated at
47 fire fatalities per accident. Most if not all of these impacts occurred in off-runway landings.
This matrix method of rating crash characteristics helps to provide an indication of which crash
characteristics belong in the generalized crash scenarios.
The matrix of landing accidents, with eight events recorded, is presented in Table C-2. The most
serious structural failure is the "wing separated" with a rating of 32.5 fire fatalities per accident.
The "engine separated" damage is more common but not as lethal per accident. "Explosion" ap-
pears to have the highest fire fatality rating {55.5 fire fatalities per accident). The "bounced back
into air" characteristic was a substantial factor in the high number oi fatalities for accident
No. 2-17.
The matrix of takeoff accidents, with 16 events entered, is presented in Table C-3. The struc-
tural failure with the highest rating of fire fatalities per accident is the "wing separated" failure.
However, the most common failure is the "ruptured wing tank" 112 accidents) followed closely by
the "separated landing gear".
"Fuselage breaks" become prominent in the category of takeoff accidents, with 60.5 fire
fatalities per accident rating, in spite of the fact that this accident characteristic permits oc-
cupants access to safety. Other factors that deserve serious consideration in this accident
category are:
1. "Vehicles" in the path of motion (63 fire fatalities per accident)
2. "Cabin debris" which interferes with egress (79.7 fire fatalities per accident rating)
3. "Fuel spill" with a rating of 62.4 fire fatalities per accident.
GENERALIZED POSTCRASH FIRE SCENARIOS
Three groups of Generalized Postcrash Fire Scenarios (GPFS) were developed. These break
down into:
1. Approach flight mode
2. Landing flight mode
3. Aborted takeoff.
These scenarios were constructed from data derived from actual accidents, with emphasis on the
more serious mishaps. This is a preliminary effort to define typical GPFSs that are vital for judg-
ing the availability of adequate passenger egress capability in existing and future aircraft. The
GPFSs given in this report were based on data from past accidents and may be satisfactory for
existing aircraft. Adjustments to these GPFSs may be required for aircraft designed in the
future.
The events of the GPFS grouped in the approach flight mode and in the landing flight mode are
arranged in chronological order. The aborted takeoff GPFSs are presented in the form of failures
of high probability that result in serious consequences. These aborted takeoff GPFSs are divided
into three basic types:
1A - Aircraft does not become airborne
1B -- Aircraft becomes airborne but returns to land before retracting landing gear or flaps
2 - Collision with aircraft or other object during the takeoff roll.
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Theapproat'hflight mode GPFS contains six variations.
The landing flight mode GPFS contains two variations.
The aborted takeoff GPFS has three variations.
o Approach Flight Mode
The approach flight mode GPFS consists ol 13 chronologically arranged events that
describe the principal scenario elements which influence the survivability of the aircraft
occupants.
The 13 scenario elements are not taken from one accident but some elements represent
average values for a group of accidents while other scenario elements represent critical
minimum or maximum values from the same group of accidents {Reference Appendices B
and C}.
The numbers ol aircraft occupants for this scenario are average values taken from
Table C-1.
Average total = 1043/11 = 95
Average number of serious injuries -- 169/11 = 15
Average number of fatalities
Impact trauma = 263/11 = 24
Fire = 310/11 = 28
° Performance at impact
This scenario is considered to occur at less than full flaps {approximately 25 degTeesl.
Thus the aircraft speed should be taken to be about 15 percent above VSTALL and
should account for adverse ground winds of about 7.5 knots. The rate of descent is
derived from the average of the data of Table C-1.
Relative ground airspeed, VRG A = 1.15 V s + 7.5
Vertical rate of descent = 2 x airline recommendations
7.62 m/s (1500 fpm}
, Preimpact Preparation
This type of accident generally occurs with the crew not fully aware of the true altitude
of the aircraft. Thus it will be assumed that:
A. The crew has not issued last minute instructions to the passengers but the safety
belts are fastened.
B. The airport fire department has not been alerted to the imminent aircraft ground
impact.
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° I,ocation of ground impact
The approach type of accident generally impacts the ground short of the runway
anywhere from a few meters to several kilometers. Thus there will be two possible
locations.
A. Short of the runway
B. On the runway
o Structural damage
The following structural systems are prominently involved in approach scenario
accidents.
Separated main gear
Separated wing
Ruptured wing tank or fuel line
Separated engine
Fuselage breaks
. Ground Slide
The ground slide will be short if the aircraft impacts an obstacle but will be long if no
sizable obstacle is encountered two lengths of aircraft slide is recommended.
A. 183 m {600 feet) off runway - stopped abruptly at a tree or wall. This is an
average for Approach Accidents 1-1, 1-6, 1-23, and 1-25.
B. 792 m (2600 feet) on runway - uniform deceleration. This is an average for
Approach Accidents 1-2, 1-15, 1-21, and 1-22.
J Fire start
A fire can start almost at the time of impact. The source of fuel is a ruptured tank or
fuel line. The ignition sources are hot temperature engine parts, electric wiring and/or
friction sparks.
A. Five seconds after impact
Source - separated main gear
Fuel -- ruptured wing tank
Ignition -- electric wiring or friction sparks
B. Six seconds after impact
Source - separated engine
Fuel - ruptured wing tank
Ignition - hot engine parts
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°.
C. Six seconds after impact
Source - ruptured fuel line
Fuel - fuel line
Ignition - electric wiring
Ground slide time
This is the time from ground impact to when the aircraft comes to a stop. The slide
time is a function of impact airspeed and the length of the slide (Ref. Items 1 and 5).
183
A. Aircraft stops in VB6A/1.944 seconds (approx.)
792
B. Aircraft stops in VRCA/3.888 seconds {approx.)
Cabin environment
Substantial cabin debris, many seat failures
Emergency cabin lights fail
9. Fire Department is alerted by control tower.
10. Passengers start to move toward exits when the aircraft becomes stationary.
11.
12.
13.
Time available for egress
Time of useful function from impact = 90 seconds {Reference Accident 1-2)
Exits used for egress *
Total number of aircraft exits = X
Average total number of aircraft exits = 7.2 (Table C-l}
Average number of exits used when the fuselage breaks = 1 {Table C-l)
Average number of exits used when the fuselage does not break --
1/5 {6 + 2 + 1 + 5 + 4) -- 3.6 {Table C-l)
Rate of egress
The rates of egress for various types of exits were derived from the data of Approach
Accident 1-2. This is one of the very few accidents from which data of this type is
available.
Escape time after aircraft came to a halt -- 63 seconds
*The numbers of exits used for egress by cabin occupants in these accidents does not reflect the total number of exits usable in all
cases.
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Total Number
Exit of Survivors
Overwing
2 Left 17
Left Ait 13
2 Right 5
Fwd Main Door 11
Galley Door 9
Egress Time
Per Survivor
63 x 2/17 = 7.4 sec
63/13 = 4.8 sec
63/11 = 5.7 sec
63/9 = 7.0 sec
. Landing Flight Mode
As was done for the approach scenarios, landing mode GPFS consist of 13 chronological
accident scenario elements which affect passenger and crew survivability. These elements
were derived from the landing category accident data described in Appendices B and C.
Passenger egress rates and time of useful function (TUF) were taken from Accident 2-1
whereas some average type values were derived from Table C-2.
The numbers of aircraft occupants for this scenario are
Table C-2.
Average total = 702/8 = 88
Average number of scenario injuries = 106/8 - 13
Average number of fatalities
Impact trauma = 57/8 - 7
Fire = 171/8 = 21
average values taken from
.
.
Performance at impact
This scenario is considered to occur at full flaps (approximately 45 degrees). The
airspeed at the point of impact will be taken as VSTAL L with an increase of ten percent
for the possibility of encountering wind shear situation. The VWIND is assumed to be
zero. The rate of descent is derived from the average of the data of Table C-2.
Relative ground airspeed, VR6 A = 1.10 V s
Vertical rate of descent = 1.4 x airline recommendation
5.33 m/s (1050 fpm)
Preimpact preparation
The crew is aware that a landing is imminent. Thus it will be assumed that
A. The crew has issued last minute instructions to the passengers. The safety belts
are fastened.
14
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B. The airport fire department has been alerted if there is a probability of trouble.
Location of ground impact
The aircraft impacts the airport runway
Structural damage
These structural systems are involved in many serious landing scenario accidents
Separated engine or wing
Wing tank rupture
Main and/or nose gear separation
Fuselage breaks
Ground slide
The use of wheel braking, reduced reverse engine thrust and approximately VSTAL L
with full flaps helps produce a moderate airport slide average of 320m (1050 feet) in
spite of a wet runway. Reference Table C-2.
Fire start
A fire can start almost at the time of impact. The source of fuel is a ruptured tank or
fuel line. The ignition sources are hot temperature engine parts, electric wiring and/or
friction sparks.
Average value for ground wind -- 9 knots. This type of accident is very frequently
accompanied by fog or rain.
Ao Five seconds after impact
Source - separated main gear
Fuel - ruptured wing tank
Ignition -- electric wiring or friction sparks
B. Six seconds after impact
Source - separated engine
Fuel -- ruptured wing tank
Ignition -- hot engine parts
Ground slide time
This is the time from ground impact to when the aircraft comes to a stop
320
The aircraft stops in VRGA/3.888 seconds (approx)
15
..
Many seat failures
Emergency cabin lights failed.
Fire Department
The first fire truck arrives at the wreckage at about 1-1/2 minutes (average) after the
aircraft has stopped when impact occurred on the runway of a domestic airport.
10. Passenger start to move toward the exits when the aircraft movement is halted.
11.
12.
Time of useful function
Time available for egress is three minutes after the aircraft came to a halt. (Reference
Accident 2-1)
Exits used for egress
Total number of aircraft exits = X
Average total number of aircraft exits = 8.4 (Table C-2)
Average number of exits used when the fuselage does or does not have breaks = 4.6
{Table C-l)
13. Rate of egress
The rates of egress for various types of exits were derived from the data of Landing
Accident 2-1 described in Reference 2. Witnesses estimated that the evacuation was
completed within three-to-five minutes after the aircraft came to a halt. An average of
four minutes will be used for actual egress rate estimates.
Exit
Left Fwd
Main Door
Estimated Estimated Estimated
Minimal Actual Actual Egress
Evacuation Evacuation Time Per
Total Number Time Time Survivor
of Survivors (Sec) (Sec) (See)
32 90 180 180/32 = 5.6
Right Fwd
Window
1 2O 40
Right Aft
Window
25 65 130 130/25 = 5.2
Right Rear
Galley Door
40 120 240 240/40 = 6.0
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Minimal time estimates derived from evacuation demonstrations
evacuation was completed within two minutes (Figure 13, Reference 2).
3. Aborted Takeoff Scenario
showed that
Type IA -- Aborted Takeoff (Airplane does not get airborne)
This event is an aborted takeoff where the airplane did not get airborne prior to the attempt
to stop the airplane. There are a variety of reasons for aborting takeoff, typically tire
failures, engine failures, other types of hardware failures, or false signals to the cockpit.
The characteristic results are that the airplane leaves the runway or taxiway, resulting in
failure of the main gear (8 out of 10). Failure of the main gear causes a rupture of the fuel
tank either from the impact forces on the wings (5 out of 8) or from direct damage (3 out of
8) from the failed landing gear. This results in a fuel spill (8 out of 8) and usually a fire (6 out
of 8). In two of the eight cases studied, where fuel was spilled and no fire occurred, one
aborted takeoff occurred with approximately 6 inches of snow on the ground while the other
took place in a ground fog. Once the airplane stops moving, the fuel puddles and fire tends
to surround the fuselage within a relatively short time.
Accidents studied in forming the above scenario are listed in Table 3.
TABLE 3
ABORTED TAKEOFF SCENARIO (TYPE 1A) CANDIDATES
ACCIDENT
NO.
3-1
3-3
3-9
3-14
3-19
3-20
3-21
3-23
3-27
3-28
LOCATION
ROME
KENTUCKY
STOCKTON
ANCHORAGE
BANGOR
GREENSBORO
JFK
DENVER
LOSANGELES
TORONTO
DATE
11-23-64
11-06-67
10-16-69
11-27-70
6-20-73
12-17-73
11-12-75
11-16-76
3-1-78
6-6-78
MODEL
B707
B707
DC-8
DC-8
DC-8
DC-9
DC-10
DC-9
DC-10
DC-9
FATALITIES
TOTAL |%)
48/73 (66)
1136 (2.7)
0/5 (0)
47/229 (21)
01261 (0)
0/90 (0)
01139 (0)
0/86 (0)
2/200 {1 )
2/107 (1.9)
FIRE
FATILITIES
TOTAL (%)
48173 (66)
1/36 (2.7)
0/5 (0)
47/229 (21 )
01261 (0)
0/90 (0)
01139 (0)
0/86 (0)
2/200 (0)
0/107 (0)
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TYPE 1B - Aborted Takeoff (Airplane gets airborne, then tries to land on remaining runway)
During the course of a normal takeoff, an initial event occurs during or after rotation which
causes an attempt to abort the takeoff and land on the remaining runway. The airplane then con-
tacts the runway again and overruns or slides off the side of the runway, resulting in landing
gear failure (if extended} and breakup of the airplane. There is fuel spilled as the airplane breaks
up. In the cases that were examined where fire occurred following the fuel spill, the fatalities
were 60 to 80 percent of the total number of passengers onboard. Where no fire occurred, even
though fuel was spilled, there were no fatalities. (See Table 4.)
TABLE 4
ABORTED TAKEOFF SCENARIO (TYPE IB) CANDIDATES
ACCIDENT
NO.
3-7
3-8
3-12
3-17
LOCATION
SIOUX CITY, IOWA
MOSES LAKE,
WASHINGTON
PHILADELPHIA, PA
MOSCOW, USSR
DATE
12127178
6/24/69
7119170
11128172
MODEL
DC-9-15
CV880
737-222
DC-8-62
PERCENT OF TOTAL ABOARD
IMPACT AND FIRE
FATALITIES
0
60
0
8O
FIRE
FATALITIES
o
60
0
UNKNOWN
TYPE 2 - Aborted Takeoff (Ground collision with other vehicle)
During the takeoff roll, there is a collision that renders the airplane incapable of sustained flight
and causes both structural damage and fuel leakage. When the airplane comes to rest, fire con-
sumes most of its structure where there has been damage to the fuel tanks. (See Table 5.)
TABLE 5
ABORTED TAKEOFF SCENARIO (TYPE 2) CANDIDATES
ACCIDENT
NO.
3-18
3-25
LOCATION
CHICAGO, III.
TENERIFE,
CANARY ISLANDS
DATE
12120172
3/27/77
MODEL
DC-9-31
AND CV880
B747 P.A.
AND
B747 KLM
PERCENT OF TOTAL ABOARD
IMPACT AND FIRE
FATALITIES
22
89
FIRE
FATALITIES
22
61
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SECTION 4
CRASH FIRE SAFETY CONCEPTS
A review of the crash characteristics and associated injuries shown in Tables C-l, C-2 and C-3
revealed subsystems which deserved to be investigated. These subsystems belonged within the
responsibilities of one oi the three following engineering groups:
1. Cabin Interiors - cabin subsystems
2. Power Plant - engines and fuel systems
3. Structural Mechanics - primary and secondary structures.
The call for safety concepts brought the following response. These concept descriptions are
brief. The concepts that were chosen as candidates for concept characterization in Section 6 have
received further definition there.
CABIN INTERIORS - SAFETY CONCEPTS
C1 - Evaluate the effect of reducing the amount of combustible materials in the cabin.
C2 - Appraise the use of more iire-resistant seat materials, such as providing a fire barrier
material for the polyurethane seat foams.
C3 - Form an assessment of improving the burnthrough time of various fuselage and cabin
sidewall configurations.
C4 - Judge the effect on the use of evacuation slides which have a protective aluminized
coating.
C5 - Appraise the use of fire-resistant curtains to divide the aircraft cabin into compart-
ments so as to limit the spread of smoke and flames.
POWER PLANT -- SAFETY CONCEPTS
PI -- Appraise the installation of an extinguishing foam application system into the airplane
to control internal or external fires.
P2 -- Evaluate the use of fuels with anti-misting properties.
P3 - Evaluate methods to alter the flow from open fuellines.
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P4 - Examineconceptsof controllingfuel leakagefrom rupturesat highly stressed attach
points (during accidents) by installing localized flexible tank walls.
STRUCTURES - SAFETY CONCEPTS
S1 - Assess the effect of providing additional cabin emergency exit.
$2 - Evaluate the effect on the crashworthiness of aircraft cabins if selected crash scenarios
were used as aircraft design conditions.
$3
- Assess the use of more severe criteria for the attachment and structural design of
galleys, ceiling panels, lavatories, and other cabin equipment.
$4
$5
Establish the effect on the crashworthiness of an aircraft of attaching the main landing
gear to the fuselage.
Determine the effect of placing the wing attach fittings for the main landing gear some
distance away from the wing tank areas.
$6 - Evaluate the use of intercostals and seals to keep the fuel away from engine, landing
gear, and control surface fittings that are attached to the wing tank structure.
$7 Assess the value of moving the forward edge of the wing tank aft and/or installing fuel
bags along the forward edge of the wing fuel tank, to minimize the effect of aircraft ac-
cidents involving impact with trees or utility poles.
$8 - Rate the effect of placing wing-mounted engines on top of the wing between the front
and rear spars.
$9 - Study the crashworthiness of a high wing design.
$10 - Evaluate the effect of moving the boundary of the wing inboard fuel tank a prescribed
distance outboard of the side of the fuselage.
$11 - Assess the influence on impact energy levels of reductions in approach, landing, and
takeoff speeds.
2O
SECTION 5
PARAMETERS USED IN CONCEPT EVALUATION
Appropriate parameters were used to evaluate the degree of merit of various concepts for im-
proving aircraft crashworthiness. The parameters fell into three categories: cost, effectiveness,
and societal concern.
The merit of a concept is a function of parameters that are intimate with the design objective of
the concept. For each design or conceptual alternative, these parameters take on a specific set of
magnitudes. These parameters will be combined into a single number which expresses the merit
of the design. The best design among competing alternatives produces the largest merit value.
The cost element can be represented in one of two ways: acquisition cost, or direct operating
cost. From the viewpoint of airline management, direct operating cost is the most desirable
measure, since it includes the acquisition cost of each incremental change to the airplane. From
the manufacturer's point of view he must know, with some precision, the magnitude of costs in-
volved with proposed modifications. In any event, a baseline must be identified and its cost
established so as to derive the effect of incremental changes.
Direct operating costs are derived by use of the Douglas Advanced Engineering Method, which
represents a continuum of updating of the 1967 ATA Method. The major modifications made for
updating include 1980 price levels, current operating practices, profiles and performance, and
system attributes. The basic constituents of the direct operating cost (DOC) of aircraft are flight
crew, cabin crew, airframe depreciation, engine depreciation, insurance, landing fees, airframe
maintenance, engine maintenance, and fuel costs. A typical DOC schedule represents a single
airplane with a representative type of operation.
Acquisition costs include the price of the aircraft, with estimates of proposed candidates for
changes derived on a discrete basis. This means that proposed modifications to the baseline,
such as changes in structures configurations, have been reviewed as separate issues for each
configuration. The development program, which includes also the type certification, has been
summarized over a given quantity designated as a breakeven point. Cost elements used to
derive a price are shown below:
• Design Engineering
• Fabrication
• Assembly
• Inspection
• Tooling
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Raw Materials and Purchased Parts
Instruments and Special Equipment
Product Support
Sustaining Engineering
Sustaining Tooling
Manufacturing Development
Planning
Flight Test
Laboratories
Propulsion
Miscellaneous
The nature of the study dictates very clearly that case examples have to be structured hypo-
thetically, since quantities of airplanes must be assumed for amortization purposes and break-
even determinations. Other factors include use of new or existing aircraft, class of airplane, etc.
The parameters for concept evaluation belong to the three categories previously mentioned:
cost, effectiveness, and societal concerns. A list of parameters follows:
1. Cost
2. Effectiveness
3. Societal Concerns
Direct Operation Cost
Acquisition Cost
Weight
Change in the Number of Fatalities
Change in the Number of Injuries
Change in the Severity of Injuries
Change in Time of Useful Function (TUF)
Change in Litigation Fees and Settlements
Environmental Pollution
Energy Conservation
For purposes of cost and effectiveness estimating, acceptable concepts will be considered either
of the type which could be retrofited on existing aircraft or of the type which could only be fac-
tory installed. However, the effectiveness of the concept applies only to the few aircraft involved
in accidents resulting in fire fatalities and injuries. Furthermore, some concepts may benefit
more passengers than other concepts. On this account, the costs, effectiveness, and societal con-
cerns applied to aircraft changes are analyzed on the basis of the total number of transport air-
craft to be manufactured during the period from 1985 to 2005. This analysis permits making an
equitable comparison of different concepts. It seems fitting to estimate the costs, effectiveness,
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and societal concerns from 1985 to 2005 as this is approximately the period that would benefit
from any useful concepts resulting from this study. A 20-year period is considered appropriate
for a new generation of aircraft. It will be necessary to project existing data into the future to ob-
tain numbers of accidents, fatalities, injuries, aircraft in service, airline flights, and passengers
for the 20-year period to be used.
It is possible that some concepts may do better in combinations than other concepts. However,
our evaluation has been performed for the selected concepts on the basis that each concept to be
analyzed is the only concept added to an otherwise conventional aircraft of current vintage.
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SECTION 6
CONCEPT CHARACTERIZATION
The exercise of concept characterization lays the foundation for the concept evaluation task of
Phase II of the Postcrash Fire Study. Methods and examples of costing various concepts are
given as well as a method of judging concept effectiveness.
There are two types of safety concepts:
. One type requires a change to the basic structure that can only be incorporated during the
construction of the aircraft. These changes will be introduced gradually into the world fleet.
Structures concept $1, which calls for additional emergency exits in the cabin, and $8,
which calls for engines mounted on top of the wing, are examples of this type of structural
modification (see Section 4).
. This type of concept can be implemented in an aircraft after the aircraft has been com-
pleted. The world fleet could be modified to conform with this concept in a finite length of
time. Most of the interiors and power plant concepts involve changes of this type.
To make a fair cost comparison between the Type 1 and Type 2 safety concepts, a realistic cost
evaluation will be needed. Thus, the Type 1 costs have been computed in a manner compatible
with the gradual introduction of such safety concepts into the world fleet. By contrast, Type 2
costs have been assumed to occur soon and to permit world fleet conversion over a period of a
few years. Type 2 costs might include labor needed to remove obsolete equipment from the air-
craft already in service. Additional costs for Type 2 concepts should also include modified, new
aircraft brought into airline service as replacements over a period of years.
Concept effectiveness has been determined by examining each appropriate aircraft accident to
judge how a concept could influence the Crashworthiness Index as discussed under Concept Ef-
fectiveness later in this section. An example of this technique is an analysis accomplished for two
variations of the structural safety concept $1.
Concept costs need to be based on the future size of the world fleet, and concept effectiveness
needs to be based on future numbers of aircraft flights and future numbers of airline passengers
and crews. To produce these goals, statistical predictions have been made of future world airline
usage. These predictions are presented in Appendix D.
Analyses of societal concerns for the concepts of this study are beyond the scope of this inves-
tigation.
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RULESFORCONCEPTEVALUATION
Methods for estimating costs and effectiveness may vary from concept to concept. Thus, certain
rules are needed to permit concept estimates to be comparable. The following estimating rules
are recommended for utilization in the Cost/Benefit Assessment Task of the Phase II effort.
Ii The concept will be considered for only one of three classes of aircraft {i.e. small, inter-
mediate, and jumbo}.
. The design, test, and certification work will be accomplished during the period from 1981 to
1985.
o
o
°
The new aircraft will be fabricated during the 1985-2005 period at a rate of 100 per year.
This rule is established so as to implement safety concepts which are so radical that they
must be designed into the original aircraft.
For safety concepts which can be so implemented as to be installed retroactively, it will be
assumed that the world fleet is converted during the years 1981-1985.
The airline service evaluation of the direct operating cost and effectiveness of a concept will
be for the period 1985-2005.
. The number and types of accidents for a particular class of aircraft without the safety con-
cept will be projected to the future from accident data for the 1960-1979 period.
7. The distribution of yearly departure totals will be as follows:
o
Small aircraft
Intermediate aircraft
Jumbo aircraft
2X departures
2X departures
X departures
Departures of aircraft equipped with the proposed safety concept will be assumed to con-
tain 100-percent load factor.
. The numbers and types of injuries for accidents of the 1985-2005 period for particular
classes of aircraft without the safety concept will be projected directly from accident data
for 1960-1979. This projection will serve as the base data for judging the effectiveness of a
safety concept.
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DESCRIPTION OF SELECTED SAFETY CONCEPTS
There are a total of twenty safety concepts described in Section 4. By engineering group they
are:
Five for cabin interior
Four for power plant
Eleven for structures
Three of these concepts (one from each engineering group) were selected for design definition
and cost and effectiveness analysis. This effort is described below and the selected concepts are:
C2: Improved fire-resistant seat materials
P2: Anti-misting kerosene (AMK)
SI: Additional cabin emergency exits
Safety Concept C2: Improved fire-resistant seat materials
Organic materials used to construct passenger seats account for approximately 10 percent of the
entire organic weight of aircraft cabins. Seat cushions are largely comprised of fire-retardant
polyurethane foam, but there are seat materials being developed which may improve the fire re-
sistance of passenger seats.
A NASA-funded program to evaluate passenger seat materials has provided the following con-
clusions:
1. Because it is highly fire-resistant at moderate heat flux values and lighter than
polyurethane foam, po]yimide foam may replace polyurethane in the near future.
2. A polyurethane cushion incorporating a protective fire barrier is a feasible approach.
The cost and weight impacts of improved fire-resistant seat cushions are illustrated by Figures 1
and 2, respectively. Eight configurations are listed, each representing a complete cushion
assembly, i.e. upholstery, liner, fire blocking, if applicable, and the cushion itself. The costs in-
clude materials and labor. Configuration No. 1 is a baseline, representative of a contemporary in-
service cushion assembly. Configurations No. 2, 3, 4, and 5 are polyurethane cushions, each
employing a different fire-blocking material. In configurations No. 4 and 5, the wool upholstery
is replaced with a Kermel/wool blend. The Airex foam included in configurations No. 4 and 8
27
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serves as a flotation element. In configurations No. 6, 7, and 8, the polyurethane foam is replaced
with a polyimide foam. Because this latter foam is still under development, costs of cushions
made with this new foam are represented by a wide range of values.
Full-scale burn tests have been conducted on seat bottoms and seat back cushions constructed
for each of the eight seat assemblies. One set of eight has been subjected to a 73.6 kW radiant
heat source.
Another set of eight seat assemblies has been subjected to the heat of a pan of burning fuel. The
test results are given in Tables 6 and 7.
A survey of the burn test results indicates that Configuration 6 demonstrated superior proper-
ties to the baseline and was chosen for cost evaluation. The chief superiority is in the significant
"Total Weight Loss" column where Configuration 6 produced the lowest value of all configura-
tions for both types of test subjected to radiant heat and to burning fuel. This low production of
the products of combustion is reflected in photometer readings which indicate superior visibility.
Temperature measurements have proved somewhat superior, and production of toxic gases is on
a par with the other configurations. Figure 1 indicates higher material and labor costs than for
baseline cushions. The weight associated with Configuration 6 is 31 percent greater than the
baseline weight but is less than that of the majority of the other configurations.
TABLE 6
RESULTS - FULL SCALE FLAMMABI LITY TEST OF AIRCRAFT SEAT PROTOTYPES
HEAT SOURCE - 73.6 kW RADIANT ENERGY
PHOTOMETER
(AVERAGE)
SEAT NO. (%)
1 24
BASELINE
2 52.5
3 40
4 37.5
5 30
6 57.5
7 62
8 47.5
CHX CO CO 2 02
(%I (%) (%) (%I
0 0 2 19.9
0 0 0.5 20.5 _
0 0 0.5 20.5
0 0 0.5 20,5
0 0 0.5 20.5
0 0 0.5 20.5
0 0 0.5 20
0 0 0.5 20.5
CUSHION CEILING
TEMPERATURE TEMPERATURE
(AVERAGE) (AVERAGE)
(OCl (oc)
450 270
210 141
215 162
220 155
240 134
275 12O
790 123
275 120
VENT TOTAL
AIR WEIGHT
OUT LOSS
lOG) (kg)
50 14.5
50 7.7
50 11.6
I
50 8.6
50 8.9
40 3.9
40 5.7
40 4.8
3O
TABLE 7
RESULTS - FULL SCALE FLAMMABILITY TEST OF AIRCRAFT SEAT PROTOTYPES
HEAT SOURCE - FUEL PAN WITH ONE LITER JET A FUEL
PHOTOMETER
iAVERAGE)
SEAT NO. (%)
FUEL PAN 35
ONLY
1 23.5
BASELINE
2 21
3 22.5
4 25
5 27.5
6 30
7 30
8 17
CHX CO CO 2 02
(%) (%1 I%) (%)
i -,,
0 0 0.5 20
0 0 2.5 1B.5
0 0 1 19
0 0 1 19.5
0 0 1 20
0 0 1 20
0 0 1 20
0 0 1 20.5
0 0 1 20
CUSHION CEILING
TEMPERATURE TEMPERATURE
(AVE RAG E) {AVE RAG E )
(°el (oc)
82
575 I 313
375 150
275 121
100 86
85 86
77.5 75
138 74
315 89
VENT • TOTAL
AIR WEIGHT
OU T L OSS
(°C) (kg)
50
75 14.5
55 5.1
50 6.1
45 3.7
50 2.0
45 O.B
50 1.1
40 2.8
Safety Concept P2: Anti-misting kerosene (AMK)
Turbine-powered aircraft crashes in which fuel is released from ruptured wing and fuselage
tanks can occur in such a manner that the fuel assumes the form of a fine mist. Random ignition
sources can turn this mist into a fireball that might envelop the aircraft as it comes to rest.
Suppression of the tendency of the turbine fuel to form this fine mist is the purpose of Safety
Concept P2. Such anti-misting fuels have been achieved by addition of a relatively low concen-
tration of polymers having very high molecular weight. In the concept offered here, it has been
assumed that the AMK must be degraded (subjected to some mechanical shearing process) to
render it suitable for an aircraft engine system.
The factors which influence the AMK concept cost parameters are:
° Degrader installation (twin-engine aircraft)
One degrader per engine - weight = 2 × 4.536 = 9.072 kg (20 lb)
Miscellaneous structure and plumbing - weight = 2 × 4.536 = 9.072 kg (20 lb)
TOTAL = 18.14 kg (40 lb)
2. Cruise fuel flow increase is 0.06%.
An estimate of 7.46 kW (10 horsepower) will be used at cruise for degrading fuel.
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° The fuel cost increase is based on $4.409 per kg 152.00 per pound) of additive material
plus 1.057 cents per liter (4 cents per galionl increase for processing and fuel delivery
equipment cost.
Safety Concept $1: Additional cabin emergency exits
The sizes and numbers of cabin emergency exits for a transport aircraft are regulated by FAA.
In this effort, a study was made of the characteristics resulting from the addition of extra cabin
emergency exits. The cost and effectiveness studies were carried out for two and four additional
emergency exits which are identified as Safety Concepts $1-1 and $1-2 respectively. In these
concepts, the added exits are supplied with "Jet Escape Doors." This door is floor flush, with an
escape slide, and it is hinged at the floor line. It is an FAA Type III door. The weight penalty is
about 136 kg (300 pounds) per door, including door, hinges, emergency slide, and fuselage
doublers.
WORLD AIR TRANSPORT STATISTICS
Basic considerations are as follows:
Safety concepts will be implemented in future aircraft.
Concept costs will depend on the total numbers of the future world fleet of transport air-
craft.
Concept benefits will depend on the numbers of future aircraft accidents.
The number of future aircraft accidents will depend on the numbers of future aircraft
flights.
The number of future casualties will depend on the numbers of future aircraft passenger
and crew loads.
Thus, a world air transport statistical survey was carried out for the years 1960-1979 inclusive.
From this basic data, projections were made for the years 1980-2005 and are presented in
Appendix D. The conclusions of this statistical study are summarized in the plots of Figures D-l,
D-2, and D-3.
CONCEPT COST
In this study, the concepts developed have been assessed using arbitrary measures that are in-
tended to gauge the cost benefits. This particular section of the report covers the cost measure
tot the sacrifices).
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The cost data presented in Tables 8 and 9 were derived
assumptions shown below.
1. All cost data are expressed in constant 1980 dollars.
in accordance with the simplified
2. Cost data represent budgetary and planning estimates are intended only for the purpose of
examining differences among the concepts and are not intended for pricing purposes.
.
.
Costs are based on the assumption that concepts are applied only to fleet-entry airplanes.
This negates the requirement to examine retrofit and modification alternatives.
Costs are representative of those which could be experienced with a current state-of-the-
art twin-engine commercial air transport.
TABLE 8
DELTA AIRPLANE COSTS FOR GIVEN FLEET SIZE
CONCEPT NUMBER
C2 (SEAT MATERIALS}
CONFIGURATION 6
CUMULATIVE AIRCRAFT COSTS
(MILLIONS OF CONSTANT 1980 DOLLARS)
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
J
10O 200 300 400 500
I.I01 2.201 3.302 4.402 5.503
P2 AMK 6.030 10.351 14.279 17.981 21.534
S 1-1 17.421 25.695 32.874 39.503 45.732
2 EMERGENCY DOORS
$1-2 41.519 58.940 77.440 92.474 106.849
4 EMERGENCY DOORS
TABLE 9
DELTA FUEL COSTS FOR GIVEN FLEET SIZE
CONCEPT NUMBER
C2 (SEAT MAlJERIALS)
CONFIGURATION 6
P2 AMK
, =
S1-1
2 EMERGENCY DOORS
$1-2
4 EMERGENCY DOORS
100
0.266
20.702
0.706
1.598
ANNUAL FUEL COSTS
(MILLIONS OF CONSTANT 1980 DOLLARS}
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
200 400 500
0.633
41.404
1.412
3.195
300
0. 799
62.106
2.118
4.793
1.065
82.808
2.824
6.39
').332
103.510
3.529
7.988
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, The cost impact caused by fuel does not account for the unpredictable annual increase in the
price of fuel, exclusive of inflationary effects.
6. Cost data are presented for fleet sizes varying from 100 to 500 airplanes.
,
,
.
Cost data are limitedto the nonrecurringand recurringcostsrequiredto implement the
proposed concepts,and the impacton fuelcostinthe categoryofoperatingcost.
Fuel costs are based on using the airplane at a block distance of 800 n mi, annual productiv-
ity of 1,000,000 n mi, and a fuel cost of $0.26 per liter ($1.00 per gallon).
Maintenance labor and materials were not considered to be so significant as to warrant
detailed examination.
10. The representative transport selected was assumed to be configured as a 185-passenger
carrier.
11. Raw materials, purchased parts, and equipment were priced with no advantage in cost
assumed for larger quantities.
12. Flight test costs for aircraft implemented with these concepts were considered to be com-
mon to the costs associated with the aircraft development and were therefore excluded
from this analysis.
Airplane delta costs for the proposed candidates for safety improvements were derived on a
discrete basis that involved use of industrial engineering techniques. This means that proposed
modifications to the baseline airplane such as structure, equipment, propulsion and fuel system,
etc., were all viewed as separate issues for each proposed candidate or concept. This required
technical inputs describing the changes and their impact on the weight statement. However, the
estimates were not based on the traditional dollar-per-pound approach but rather on man-hours
required to accomplish tasks associated with changes. The weight data provided an insight as to
the impact of changes in raw materials and fuel.
The cost elements considered in developing the airplane costs are tabulated below:
• Design Engineering * Sustaining Engineering
• Fabrication Labor • Planning Labor
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• Assembly I,abor • Special Equipment
• Inspection Labor • Sustaining Tooling Labor
* Tooling • Raw Materials and Purchased Parts
With the exception of purchased materials, parts, and equipment, all labor estimates were con-
sidered to be based on in-house experience. In developing these estimates, the following key
assumptions were made:
1. Labor costs include a direct labor rate, overhead, G&A, and a reasonable return on invest-
ment.
2. Direct labor rates were varied by organization function.
3. Technologies were assumed to be available and off the shelf.
The effects of safety concepts on the airplane nonrecurring and recurring costs are contained in
Table 8 as a function of fleet size. Both types of costs are combined into a Single value with no
assumptions made about breakeven points. The impact of weight changes on fuel costs is con-
tained in Table 9, as well as any changes that occur to alter fuel consumption as a result of
various types of safety concepts.
In developing costs for the escape doors, each type of door was broken down into three primary
areas for which labor costs were developed and segregated. These door elements were the door,
jamb, and panel. The slide and miscellaneous hardware were excluded because they were con-
sidered to be purchased parts, and those costs were developed in the materials category. All
labor, however, was calculated as fabrication and assembly labor. Tooling was estimated based
on the location of the door in its specific area of the fuselage; and if commonality existed with any
other door, it was considered in the estimate. Fuel cost deltas reflect the impact of the delta door
weight, with credit given for fuselage structure removed.
Estimated cost impact of the introduction of new seat materials is reflected only in the delta pro-
curement cost of the new seats plus the impact of the delta weight on the fuel usage. Since seat
structure was not involved, it has been assumed that installation costs for seats will remain con-
stant and should be excluded from the analysis.
With respect to the anti-misting kerosene concept, the estimated cost impact has included pro-
curement of a degrading device (which was assumed to be developed, and hence procured as an
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off-the-shelf item) and its installation, including fabrication and assembly of miscellaneous struc-
ture and plumbing to accommodate the device. The total impact of weight per aircraft caused by
the anti-misting device and miscellaneous hardware is 18 kg per airplane. However, the
degrader is expected to result in an increase of cruise fuel flow of 0.06 percent, estimated on the
basis that 7.46 additional kW will be used at cruise for degrading the fuel. This is in addition to
the fuel increase expected as a result of the delta weight. A fuel cost increase of $0.02 per liter
has been factored into the estimate, based on an assumed additive material cost of $0.91 per kg
plus $0.01 per liter processing and fuel delivery equipment cost.
CONCEPT EFFECTIVENESS
Available time permitted the study for concept effectiveness to be carried out for Concept S1
only. This is the concept which calls for the addition of extra cabin emergency exits. Two varia-
tions of this concept (Concepts $1-1 and $1-2, two and four exits, respectively) were investigated
to provide information on the influence of higher quantities of exits. The results of this study are
dependent on the accuracy of the basic assumptions and estimates.
The effectiveness of these
Index (CI x)
two concepts was estimated by evaluating their Crashworthiness
A A
= ,
X = The safety concept identification number
F = Total number of fire fatalities
A F "--
S
/k S --
Change in the number of fire fatalities due to the incorporation of a safety con-
cept. (A decrease in the number of fatalities is positive.)
Total number of injuries
I
Change in the number of injuries. (A decrease in the number of injuries is
positive.)
A = Total number of aircraft accidents.
_F _UF
*Make the lesserof-- and -- equal to zero
F TUF
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/X A
TUF =
ATU F
---- Incremental number of accidents to aircraft with improved crashworthiness due
to the safety concept under examination.
Time of Useful Function, i.e., the time span, usually in seconds, during which a
passenger is in control of his actions and can take purposeful steps to evacuate
the cabin and its hostile environment.
Change in the TUF of the cabin occupants due to the installation of a safety con-
cept.
The weighting factor of 1/10 was associated with the Serious Injury Factor, /ks/S, by virtue of
the hypothesis that 10 serious injuries are equal to one fatality in estimating the value of a safety
concept.
The Accident Factor, AA/A, introduces the concept of the number of aircraft and the vacancy
factor of these aircraft which would benefit during their accident involvement from the installa-
tion of the proposed safety concept. A weighting factor of 1/4 was assigned to this factor to avoid
duplication of benefits already accounted for in the fatality and serious injury factors.
The estimates for A F, AS, and A A were accomplished by examining each accident described in
Appendices B and C and passing judgement on the influence of additional emergency exits on
passenger egress patterns. The rate of passenger egress was obtained from the evaluation of the
reports of actual evacuations given in the Generalized Approach Flight Mode Scenario work of
Section 3.
The Time of Useful Function (TUF) was not found to be altered by the addition of emergency
exits.
The computations of the Crashworthiness Index for Safety Concepts C2, P2, $1-1 and $1-2
(pages 27-32) were carried out for the accidents listed in Table 1 and described in Appendices B
and C. The results produced the following:
CIc2 = 11.03 CIs1.1 = 11.73
CIp2 - 15.16 CIsl. 2 = 12.28
These CIs were computed based on the premise that the safety concepts in question were incor-
porated in the aircraft of the 33 accidents of Table 1 at the time of the accident.
The more appropriate value of CI should be computed on the basis of effectiveness estimates
projected into the future when the concept is installed in the existing world fleet and/or the new
airliners coming off the assembly line.
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APPENDIX A
POSTCRASH FIRE ACCIDENT DATA BASE
This appendix contains the data base resulting from a review of impact
survivable post crash fire accidents. They appear in Tables A-I, A-2, & A-3.
The reference source of this data is given in the last column of Tables A-I,
A-2 and A-3. These abbreviations stand for the following.
A = ARB = Aircraft Review Board
C = CAB = Civil Aviation Board
D = DAC = Douglas Aircraft Company File
I = ICAO : International Civil Aviation Organization
N = NTSB : National Transportation Safety Board
R = REF = Reference (No.)
FAA-AM = Federal Aviation Administration - Aviation Medicine
Precedingpageblank ,,1
APPENDIX A
TABLE A.1
POSTCRASH FIRE - SURVIVABLE -- APPROACH - ACCIDENT
.o Jo'; .........
,. t_ )l b'_ u z?) sAI i IA_( Clr_ lJl _>NP?_L)
i _ 4 _, LI6 U(_t IUKCfJ JA_'AN CPA
t 4 a i &_, DC_ 5_ AUCWLANU _Z
r LYr_
6 _ J _? _)(_ MUNMOVIA L_BEH VA_IL
i i _f _/ cvB@o CONSTANCE KY T_¢A
7@ • _15f=4_ DC8 AItANTICC)'rY _;_ CAP IOL
_0 6 tJ_ B_07 CALCUTTA_ INDIA P&NA_
T tO 8 Z) SB DC_ MILAN._TALV
I ]1 I_ _EB CVSSO CHICAGO. I LL NORTH CFNTRAL P
I IP _ _ 70 CVBg0 ACAPULCO MSX : MODERNA_R
i _l tO Ic_ ?o £ :_E;,B 'N'RtGHTSTCCNN, N_ SATtJ_N
114 6 7 _1 CV_IU NEWHAVEN _ONP_ ! ALLEGHENY
_5 S _S 72 ',.X:93_ fT LAUDEROAkE FL EASTERN
1 IS i_ 8 1_ S 73) CH CAGO ILL UNITED
P,IkSSe NG[- R$ &NDCR|W Flit[
O_ fUt_ AmC_I_F T
LCW:W_tlON Ail_INt _IGl.lr T iN/l,_ _; P E nlLEASE DJU_IAGE RSF
B_' _MPAC'r STO_P_O AT LAR_ TRE_E, _N_EN_ _ , _,_ _RE AT _M_CT
AND r_R_
_ _ 'J _ _J 4_ n_PT_S._CJ _S_A_E HA_O LANDING _0_ _S _E_O_ _ C_ _.,NAY MA_N _AA _
_V _ _RE _S F_ ON _USSL_E BOTID_ C _003_
P _ 0 I_ ii4 /'_ W A_RC_A_T _MeAC_ APPROACH C_T_ _• _ _MEAC_ _EAWA_L CAUGHT _ _O_
O_SrROYED F_REONRUNWAV
B_" _MPACT
i ,., ,
r _ u 3 _ 0 w E _LIGHT GEC_ R_G_' W_NG TIP STRUCK GI_OtlND _ I_ _e_ _,G_ WING _O01 1_¢_ 10
I 3ANI_4 NO _rNG_NEIJPI_REAOTC_R_'_,_rd,_GE
E_GINE_
SEPARATEO
e Sa 0 I1_ a4 _ ! OEETROYEG STRt_K _ILI _km_l I;2M_L£Sl FRO_A_m'O_I _' _l_
a Y IMPAC_
i ANO P IRE ,
P 9O I_ _3 _1 4O W OSS_ROYED IMPAC'r183Sm(_3_T) S_I_'IT 7._I._S_rI_SLII_ 1_1_
BY _MPACT eXTERNAL _IRE SNTE_eD CAe_N _ SME_GENC_
,.. AND _-me I cxw ou_.,Ro s,,.m(
_' s:p o ;t3 I _g 0 w DESTROYED IMIt_CTTREEE2852m(g3S_FT) SHORT OF r_UNW_ SHtC _[_]
BY FIRE ; FNG_T WING. FUSELAGE WAS BROKEP_ UP
i
1 _, I 2 _ o (} E. _ G_'_,]ROYSD OFF RUNWAY LANOtNG. S_R_K OIRC_ F A_L_ LA_t_ R_)
GEAR AND PYLON5 FIRE N 1
SGVERE F_RE I IMPACT TREE 274 m IgO(I FTI $_ORT OF RUNWAY SHED 4 RillP G3 4g B I 6 _ E T DAMAGE ENGINES IN GROUND SLIDIE
P 9"> _ 13 _ DESTROYED D FI_E
A_TER
IMPACT
45 t_, 3 =7 w DESTROYED AIRCRAFT STALLED AT _ m 1925 '_ TI _L1 _IUOE AIRCRAft R _
BY (I_ACT ET_K HANGAR U_EIDE OO_
AND FIRE
C B 0 II ; 0 0 W DESTROYED r STRUCK TRESS. APPROACH LIG_T$_ BUILDaNG STOPPEL_ : N ";APEi EY IMPACT 1E3 m IS00 rTI SHORT Or RUNWAY. R(I_A_D _mE
c 3 D _ I Z O_ST_OYEO _I_ACT TRESS, G_OUNO _6_ m qS4?O P T_ _O_T O_ _UN_Y I_I
FIRE AND E XPLO_ION ¢OLLOWED IMPAC]
p 31 o _ 21 w R(llWINGS AND IMPACT 3 BUILDINGS 1490 m (4_90 FT) SHOR_ OF RUNWAY.
ENGINES FUSELAGE INTACT FUEL SPILL SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS
SEPARATE0 ; , .,
P _o } _ D 0 w O_S_O'_EO _A_O _._NO)NGON_U_WAy GEAR_A_AG_'._'mE AT _ ?_
lIT _MPACT LEFIANOR;GHTI_flNGRUOTS, FUSELAG_EXTRENGULFED
• J_o F me tN _ t._Es
P $1 7 11 43 _t_2_ T , WING AND LAN_'ING 2 4 km II I_ MI LEEI _ORT IMPACT WITH HO4JSES.%_/ FUSELAGE SHED 8OTH ENG'NSS INTENSE _IRE I_ CABIN CENTER N _316
DAMAGE BY SECTION
_ND FIRE
i IB 12 _ 72 L lot1 N MIAMI. FLA EASTERN
I 19 _ 23 13 FH 2278 S Ir LOUIS. MS O_'ARK
2O 7 31 7_ OCt31 EOSTON MASS O_LTA
_ _ 2_ 7a OC_.]_ ¢_(AIF'rANOOGA. TENN DELTA
27 12 17 73 OC _0 8OSTON MASS IBERIA
_3 I 30 74 B _07 eAGOPAGO, SAMOA PAN A_
I _,I 9 11 14 OC 93_ CHARLOTTE,NC EASTERN
_.2_ E _4 TS E 127 J_A CA. NY EASTENN
I _ 3 • 77 Des S.1 I_A_MEY NIGERIA ONA
I 2_ S 29 ?7 OCS-S2 ICUA_ A LUMPUR MAL JAL
"T -TOTAL
N._._ - NONE.'M4NOR tNJUm_ES
S - SSit _OU,S _N_UN_s
F • _ATALVTISS
p 176 I? 60 _9 14 T.W AIRCRAFT _IB km II_l MILES) IIPIORT OF RUNWAY IN MUD UNDER _'5 c_ N 73-14
L'r WlNGI OWESTROYEO 112 IN ) W_TEN _USSU_GS DISINTEGRATED C_B_N Pine
SY IW'ACT _ROM El'RAyED SUEL
/
P 44 0 6 3S O W ALL SPATE. IM_ACT3.Skm(2_3M_LSSI$_ORI OUTER ANI) CENTER WING R_I
:ISEATmELTS SECTIONS SEPARATED FROM A_RC_APT MAIN GS,I_RS EROK_ N ?4
FAILEO O_r
P Sg 0 I 118 44 E. T W O,_ETROYED STRUCK SEAWALL El4 Um 13000 ST) SHORT WING AND _:USE _' 7•3
BY IMPACT LAGS FRAGI_ENTED AND CONSUme 0 IV rmE
A_O SIRS
• 7_ ?S 41 0 0 S SU_ST,IJ_TI_CI ST_LmKLIGHTS_'NOO_S2_'9_ISr'_S_OItT LE_TWlNG N _'_3
AND LEFT GEAR &SPAR*TED _ IRE AT LFFT WING ROOT AND
ENGINE
P t67 163 ,I 0 0 T LEFT IMeACT_._GFITPlERS_WOSMBANI(e_'ENT NO _ANONO 3 _ _•_4
FUSELAGE ENGINES ANO PYLON! SEIIAR,=_ED NuP'ru_EO LEFT WING
SlOE Fins TANK EEO PINE
P 101 0 E _ _1_ W • SN_NSS STR_W:K 'tRESS AND 0R£WJNO _SS0 _ IR.I_ PEET_ $_O_T N ?4 1_
SF.PAI'tATEO _VSV(S WII_G ,INS FUSELAGE FIRE ONLY I TR_UM_ FATALI'_V
P I 10 71E2 3S W WING IROKE I_ACTSO TmESS ANG GROUND 5 3 _ _3 3 _ILESI sl,lOn_ F IRE N ?_ 9
IN SECTIONS tN CAEIN DUmNG SLIOE OWn" "rw_RMAL FATALITIES
FUSELAGE
DNEAKb'_
_' _ D _2 _1_1 _ W O_IST_OVE0 tWmACTAPPROACHLIG_$ _.S_'_WtNGOA_AGS0 P_NS N I$1
SY II_IACT SRU_'E0 IGN_TION SOU_CE_ ENGINE WINGS I=RICTION
AND F_Ne
C 4 0 2 : 0 E. w SUBSTANTIAL I_PACT CONCRSTE PD_T 50,:1 -. (_ESO l"rl S_4ORT" AIRCRA_'T O FILE
IMPACT AND ROLt.EO SACX. CAU_H_ _ IRE "RAU_A IN JURIES ONLYFIRE
P ?S 3 42 34 _ DESTROYED IMPACT TREES B km IS MfLES r _,HORT AFT FUSELAGE BROKE ) FILE
BY rI_PAC_ OFF FRONT SECTION EXP_ OOFO IN FLAMS._
AND F_RF
s: SNG X ANn
T TANK C CAB
w w_NG _ o_,c
• I: ICAO
N NT_B
R REF
42
APPENDIX A
TABLE A-2
POSTCRASH FI RE - SURVIVABLE - LANDING - ACCIDENT
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APPENDIX B
ACTUAL SCENARIOS OF POSTCRASH FIRE ACCIDENTS
The accident data base of Appendix A was surveyed to determine those accidents
for which substantial records were in hand. These accidents numbered about
thirty-five. The actual accident and fire scenarios of these thirty-five were
extracted from the records and assembled in this appendix. A list of these
accidents is given in Table I of this report (Section 3).
45
APPENDIXB
ACCIDENT #i-1 N. Constance, KY.: B727 : 11-8-65
PASSENGERS & CREW
p
T N/M S F
62 4
I.T. i FIRE
.w_-___58 .........
Nose gear, 2 main gears and tail skid in retracted and locked position. First
impact made by right wing with a tree top. Terrain up slope was 9.60 .
Aircraft slid 104 m (340 ft.) relatively intact thru scrub trees. Impacted
and came to rest amidst a group of larger trees. Nos. I and 3 engines
separated from fuselage during final impact sequence. Passengers stunned by
impact trauma.
Flame at rear of cabin
Aircraft exploded.
Intense ground fire completely destroyed aircraft cabin forward of tail.
Heavy rain started to fall.
Fatalities were attributable to severe trauma, fire or both.
4B
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ACCIDENT # I-2 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH: B727: 11-11-65
PASSENGERS & CREW
T N/M S F
91 11 33
,.
I,T. FIRE
43
Rate of descent during final approach exceeded 10.16 m/s (2000 fpm.)
Indicated airspeed at ground impact was 123 KTS. The aircraft impacted the
ground 102 m (335 ft) short of runway. The touchdown was violent. The flight
recorder noted a vertical deceleration of 4.7g. Both main landing gears
sheared off. Lower fuselage impacted the runway with aircraft slightly nose
up. 2-3 seconds after impact, there was a muffled explosion. Initial fire
occurred near the tail of aircraft in vicinity of engines. Fire broke out in
the right aft section of the cabin (aft of wing T/E). The source of this fire
was a fuel line supplying thru aft mounted engines from the wing tanks. This
line was ruptured when the right main gear strut was driven up into the
fuselage near wing T/E. The fuel from this line, still under pressure, was
ignited either from broken generator leads or friction sparks. The resulting
fire quickly burned through the cabin floor like a blow torch.
During the final swerve, the fire advanced up the fuselage. When the aircraft
stopped, it was engulfed in flame to an area forward of the wing.
Several passengers in aft section of the aircraft left seats and moved
forward. They were thrown off their feet during the final swerve. Cabin
lights went off and smoke accumulated rapidly.
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ACCIDENT #I-2 (Cont'd)
The aircraft skidded for 27 seconds on its belly and nose gear for 853 m (2800
feet) beyond the impact point. About 90 seconds elapsed between impact and
the escape of the majority of the survivors. All six of the regular exits
were used in escape (4 overwing, forward left door and the mid cabin galley
service door). The junior stewardess seated in the center jump seat in the
forward section could not press her way to the galley door through the crowd
of passengers heading toward the forward boarding door. The senior stewardess
was blocked from reaching the forward boarding door by passengers already
crowded into the area. The 2rid officer pushed his way into the cabin, opened
the forward main door and deployed the slide. The rear stairwell could not be
opened.
11 passengers exited the forward main door.
9 passengers exited the galley door
24 passengers exited the overwing exit windows.
The serious impact injury survivors were located in the forward part of the
aircraft. Burns involving more than 50% of the body surface were found in all
41 bodies remaining on board after the fire was extinguished. No signs of
mechanical trauma was evident in these bodies.
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ACCIDENT # 1-6 MONROVIA, LIBERIA : DC-8 : 5-3-67
PASSENGERS & CREW
T
90
NIM S
16 23
I,T°
11
F
i i
FIRE
40
Aircraft passed over power line 10.4 m (34 ft. 2 in.) above ground level.
Aircraft impacted ground 134 m (440 ft.) beyond power line and 1836 m (6023
ft) from the runway threshold.
DESCENT ANGLE = 4.5 o DESCENT RATE = 5.84 m/s (1150 ft/min) approx.
The ground slide was about 259 m (850 ft.)
The first ground contact was on both main and nose wheel gears. After a roll
of 11 m (36 feet), the right gear entered a hold and the undercarriage failed.
The aircraft caught fire externally during the slide.
Fire entered the fuselage through the overwing emergency exit which came open.
The fire divided the cabin at row 15.
The fire spread more rapidly toward the rear than the front.
From seat row 13 forward, there were 17 passengers and 14 crew members.
Eleven passengers and eleven crew members escaped through the front passenger
door, left side.
The pilot in command and navigator escaped through the left side cockpit
sliding window.
Six passengers from seat row ii, who subsequently died, did not evacuate
through the front section with the others.
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ACCIDENT #1-6 (CONT'D)
The cabin staff in the front section were unable to gain access through the
cabin to the rear due to the fire at row 15 rendering movement through it
impossible.
In the section rear of seat row 13, there were 54 passengers and 5 crew
members. Ten passengers and 5 crew members escaped through the left side rear
passenger door.
The majority of the 44 passengers aft of seat row 13 who did not survive were
capable of movement after the crash. Most of the bodies were found with heads
directed to the rear of the aircraft, pyramided between the last 3 rows of
seats.
Miscellaneous
Cabin lights failed after first impact rendering evacuation more difficult.
Fwd life raft compartment door opened and partially obstructed the forward
left hand door.
The contents of the fwd galley were all over the floor.
Fwd right hand passenger door was never opened.
Aft cabin, forward life compartment came open and permitted the life raft to
fall and hit crew member in seat 28D,
Closet in forward cabin broke loose and fell across the aisle.
Crew folding seat at the left aft passenger door broke.
Seat belts broke at seats 2C and 25B.
Confusion and crowding the narrow aisle existed in the darkness.
Egress was difficult due to the number of obstructions and the presence of
dense smoke and fumes.
The crash rescue crew reached the scene of the accident in 7 minutes and 40
seconds. They attacked the fire at the front but were too late to save the
rear or to assist in passenger evacuation,
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ACCIDENT #I-15 FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA.: DC9-31 : 5-18-72
PASSENGERS & CREW
T N/M S F
10
i.T.
0
FIRE
0
At 61 m (200 ft) altitude, aircraft flew into a wall of water. There was a
severe downdraft, associated with the wall of water. The high sink rate
resulted in a hard touchdown. Aircraft made contact with the runway on the
right main gear. After roll of 4.6 m (15 ft.), the left main gear contacted
the runway. The right main gear with a section of the rear sparweb separated
from the aircraft at inexact. The left main landing gear was pushed up and to
the rear but remained attached to the left wing. The nose gear remained in
the down and locked position.
Shortly after touchdown, the exterior of the fuselage aft of the wing trailing
edge was engulfed in flames emanating from the aft section of both wing root
areas. The aircraft skidded on the runway surface for a distance of 853 m
(2800 ft). The aircraft departed the right side of the runway and skidded on
the adjacent soft dirt surface for another 46 m (150 ft).
All crew members and passengers exited the aircraft through the forward main
entry door.
Total egress time was approximately 30 seconds. The first of 3 crash trucks
was at the scene, applying foam within 40 seconds of the accident occurrence
and the fire was extinguished within 2 minutes.
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ACCIDENT #I-16 CHICAGO, ILL.: B737 : 12-8-72
PASSENGERS & CREW
T S
61
N/M
11
I.To
18"
F
FIRE
25*
*e sti mated
The aircraft crashed into a residential area 2.4k m (1 1/2 miles) short of the
runway. Aircraft was in a wings level, nose high attitude. Aircraft first
penetrated the upper branches of a 6 m (20 foot) tree. The descent angle from
the initial tree contact to the final impact site was about 4.50 .
The aircraft impacted trees, houses, utility pole cables and garages before it
came to rest across the foundation of one of the destroyed houses.
The fuselage was destroyed by impact and fire except for the aft portion of
the coach section, the empennage and the left side of the cockpit. Cabin
lights went out after the impact. The left main gear was found almost fully
retracted. The right main gear was completely separated from the aircraft.
The nose gear had been retracted at impact but was torn loose from its mount.
Both engines were separated from the aircraft.
The first witnesses at the crash site stated that the structure on both sides
of the aircraft was burning and that white smoke was emanating from the fire.
The fire was very intense around the center section of the fuselage and thick
black smoke obscured part of the fuselage.
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ACCIDENT #1-16 (Cont'd)
The first fire fighting units were on the scene within 3 minutes of the crash.
Only survivor in the fuselage section forward of the wing was the flight
attendant who occupied the aft facing jumpseat at the left forward entry
door. She was seriously injured when her seat collapsed and she was trapped
by aircraft and house debris.
No first class section seats were recovered intact.
There were 17 survivors in the coach section.
Ceiling panels and hat racks with their contents fell on the passengers and in
the aisle of the coach section during impact. Seats dislodged from row 12 to
15 and obstructed the aisle. Six survivors escaped through breaks in the
fuselage. Nine passengers and 2 flight attendants exited through the rear
service door.
Elevated carbon monoxide levels were found in:
27% of the fatalities in the first class section and
76% of the fatalities in the coach section.
Elevated hydrogen cyanide levels were found in the captain and in six
fatalities in the coach sections.
Carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide are some of the toxic products of the
thermal decomposition of materials such as wool, cotton, paper and plastics.
Deaths of most occupants were attributed to burns. Trauma deaths were
described as "multiple injuries" and "extreme/partial body destruction."
Several deaths were described as "associated with carbon monoxide/cyanide.
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ACCIDENT #I-18 NEAR MIAMI, FLA. : L1011 : 12-29-72
PASSENGERS & CREW
T F
176
N/M S
17 60
I.T.
85
FIRE
14
While the aircraft was in a left bank of 28°, it crashed into the Everglades
at a point 30k m (18.7 miles) from Miami. The in,pact area was flat marshland
covered with soft mud under 12 to 25 cm (6 to 12 inches) of water. The left
outer wing structure impacted the ground first, followed immediately by the
No. I engine and then the left main landing gear. After impact, a flash fire
developed fromsprayed fuel. Some of the burning fuel penetrated the cabin
area, causing 14 passengers to suffer various degrees of burns on exposed body
surfaces.
No complete circumferential cross section remained for the passenger
con_Dartment of the fuselage, which was broken into four main sections and
numerous small pieces. The entire left wing and left stabilizer were
demolished.
The left main gear and nose gear and portions of their attach structure were
separated from the airplane and extensively damaged. The right main gear
remained in place in the down and locked position.
The No. i and No. 3 engines separated from their attach structure.
engine remained in place, relatively unda_ged.
The No. 2
Most of the survivors were located in the vicinity of the cockpit area, the
midcabin service area, overwing area and the empennage sections. These
sections were located at the far end of the wreckage path.
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ACCIDENT #1-18 (Con't)
In contrast, most fatalities were found in the center of the crash path.
Crushing injuries to the chest were predominant causes of death.
Due to the excessive distintegration of the cabin, this accident was not
considered survivable. A survival factor worth noting is that the seat
incorporated energy absorbers in the support structure.
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ACC IDENT #I-21 CHATTANOOGA, TENN : DC9-32 : 11-27-73
PASSENGERS
T N/M
79 75
_REW
S F
I.T. FIRE
The aircraft first struck approach lights 488 m (1600 feet) short of the
runway threshold. The aircraft continued to descend, striking additional
approach lights. It struck a dike 239 m (785 feet) short of the runway
threshold.
The left wing separated from the aircraft.
The ground fire erupted at the dike.
firefighting equipment arrived.
The fire died out hefnre the
The fuselage with the right wing and empennage attached came to a rest 76 m
(250 feet) to the left of the runway and 137 m (450 ft) beyond the runway
threshold. The left engine came to rest on the runway threshold. The landing
gear had been fully extended. The three gear assemblies were separateH from
the aircraft.
As the aircraft decelerated, a hole appeared in the floor in front of two
flight attendents in the rear cabin jumpseats, through which they wpre sprayed
with mud, debris and fuel. The cabin lights went off.
A flash fire erupted in front of the 2 flight attendants and lasted
momentarily. The fire extended from the floor to 15 inches above the
attendants head.
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ACCIDENT #I-21 (cont'd)
When the aircraft stopped, a fire erupted at the fuselage joint to the left
wing root and also near the left engine attach point. Hnwever, the fire was
dying and was extinguished in less than I minute hy crash units.
Heat and soot damaged the coach section near rows 37 and 38. Head rest towels
were burned, seat hack trays were deformed, and plastic covers and bags were
melted.
The passenger in seat 38C saw f]ames near the cabin floor.
singed and his polyester suit was melted in places.
His hair was
There were patches of dense smoke in the cabin. Baggage in the rear baggage
compartment was melted and damaged. Fuel was found in puddles in the haqQage
compartment.
The smoke in the cabin during evacuation came from the rear baggage
compartment and tail cone fires.
Numerous tears in the lower fuselage skin allowed fuel vapor from ruptured
fuel lines of the left wing to enter the cargo compartment. Fractures in the
cabin floor allowed fuel vapors to enter the main cabin. The ignition of the
vapors was probably caused by any one of several electrical sources.
The immediate availability of the four overwing exits and the main hoarding
door allowed passengers to evacuate promptly. The galley service donr was not
usable due to debris. The tail cone door could not be used because of
structural deformation caused by impact.
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ACCIDENT #I-22 BOSTON, MASS. : DC-I0-30 : 12-17-73
PASSENGERS & CREW
T N/M S F
167 163 4
I.T.
0
FIRE
The aircraft struck approach light piers 152 m (500 feet) short of runway.
The aircraft then struck an embankment. The right main gear was sheared. The
aircraft veered off the runway and skidded to a stop about 914 m (3000 feet)
from the runway threshold. The left main gear had separated from the
aircraft. The nose gear failed rearward and was embedded in the fuselage.
The centerline gear rotated aft and was embedded in the fuselage. The No. 1
engine and pylon assembly remained intact and in place. The No. 3 engine
separated from the right wing and remained under the right wing.
The aircraft caught fire while it skidded along and off the runway.
At the end of the ground slide, fire was burning under the left wing around
the left engine and along the left side of the fuselage. Fuel from the
ruptured ]eft wing fuel tank was feeding the fire. Firemen extinguished the
fire and spread a protective foam cover over the leaking fuel.
Some emergency lights did not i11uminate. The battery packs were depleted.
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ACCIDENT#I-23 PAGOPAGO,SAMOA: B707 : 1-30-74
PASSENGERS & CREW
T N/M S F
101
I,T. FIRE
95
The aircraft contacted tree tops, 3865 feet short of runway. After 72 m (236
feet), the first impact with the ground occurred. The aircraft continued
through jungle vegetation, struck a 1 m (3 foot) high lava rock wall and
stopped 942 m (3090 ft) short of runway. During the slide through the
vegetation, the landing gear outboard ailerons, outer wings, parts of flaps,
all four engines and more separated from the aircraft.
The aircraft stopped when right wing hit the MM transmitter. The lower
fuselage structure was severly damaged from the nose to the rear pressure
bulkhead. The wreckage path was 236 m (775 feet) long.
Fire was evident during the ]ast 107 m (350 feet) of wreckage path. Survivors
said that the impact forces were slightly more severe than a normal landing.
No damage to the cabin interior was reported. Large fires were seen outside
the right side of the aircraft. One person opened an overwing exit on the
right side; flames came in and he closed it. Four surviving passengers exited
the left overwing exits. The surviving copilot escaped through a hole in the
cockpit wall with the assistance of 2 cockpit crewmembers.
Some passengers rushed toward the front and rear of the cabin before the
aircraft stopped. The survivors did not hear instructions regarding escape
from the aircraft after the accident. The forward and rear entry doors were
not opened or used for escape. The rear galley service door was not opened.
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ACCIDENT #I-23 (con'd)
All fatally injured persons but one, died of smoke inhalation and/or massive
burns. Post mortem examination revealed significant levels of carbon monoxide
and hydrogen cyanide. The third officer who survived the crash died later
from traumatic leg and arm injuries and severe burns. Most of the survivors
suffered burns after they escaped from the cabin.
The fuselage from the aft pressure bulkhead forward through the cockpit area
was gutted by fire. Both wings and all fuel tanks which remained with the
aircraft were burned and melted. The No. 4 main wing tank had ruptured and
was extensively damaged by fire.
This was a survivable accident. The survival problems stemmed from post crash
fires.
1) The cabin crew did not open the primary emergency exits, (may
have been overcome by smoke).
2) The passenger reaction to the fire threat, (passenger may have
crowded against the doors).
3) Passenger inattentiveness to the pretakeoff briefings (should
have moved to the nearest exit instead of the door of entry).
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ACC IDENT #I-24 CHARLOTTE, N.C. DC-9-31: 9-11-74
PASSENGERS & CREW
T N/M
82 I 10
F
I.T. FIRE
32 39
Aircraft landed 5.3 km (3.3 miles) short.
The right wing tip broke three limbs 8 m (25 feet) above the ground. The left
wing struck and sheared a cluster of pine trees. Left main gear struck
ground, 34 m (110 ft) past initial impact. Right main gear struck grn,lnd, 35
m (115 ft.) past initial impact. Aircraft final descent angle = 4.5°
Aircraft bank angle = 5.5° left wing down. Left wing contacted ground, 60 m
(198 feet) past initial impact. Left wing hit trees, broke sections, 168 m
(550 feet) past initial contact.
Ground fire began. Right wing sheared off. Fuselage continued thru wooded
area with severe break up and came to a stop in a ravine, 303 m_gg5 ft}past
initial contact.
Nose gear was separated from fuselage. No fire damage. Right gear was
separated from fuselage. Considerable fire damage. Left gear was separated
from fuselage. Minor fire damage.
This was a partially survivable accident.
the tail retained structural integrity.
Only a small section of cabin near
In most cases, the occupant restraint system failed.
Fire occurred in the cabin during the breakup of the aircraft and burned until
extinguished by the fire dept in about 8-10 minutes after crash.
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ACCIDENT #1-24 (cont'd)
Seven passengers died of burns only. One passenger died of smoke inhalation.
Twenty-five passengers died of burns and smoke inhalation. Thirty-two died of
impact trauma. Six died of combined factors.
One survivor stated that half of his burns were caused by double-knit garments
which me]ted and adheared to his skin and could not be removed. All survivors
in the rear of the cabin were thrown out or escaped through holes in the
fuse}age. The surviving passenger and two crew members in the forward area
escaped through a cockpit window.
The forward cabin entry door was blocked by a fallen tree. The forward galley
door was blocked by the ground. The overwing escape windows were destroyed by
fire. The auxiliary exit in the tail of the aircraft was usable.
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ACCIDENT #I-25 JFK B727: 6-24-75
PASSENGERS & CREW
T N/M S F
124 12
I.T. FIRE
87 25" i
i (I
*EST
Outboard section of left wing was severed by approach towers 8 and 9. The
aircraft rolled into a 90° left bank between towers 9 and 10. Left wing
contacted ground at tower #10. Three large outboard sections of left wing
were located here. Left wing released fuel.
Fire erupted from numerous ignition sources: hot engine components,
electrical wiring in A/C, approach light system, street light system and many
friction sources. The fuselage collapsed and disintegrated. When the
fuse]age disintegrated, the cabin floor, and seat anchors failed. Occupants
became unrestrained and unconfined. Collisions caused multiple extreme impact
injuries.
Near complete destruction of aircraft fuselage. Almost all seats were torn
from their support structures were mangled and twisted and scattered over 183m
(600 feet) of aircraft slide. Almost all seatbelts remain attached to seats
and fastened.
Twelve survivors had been seated in the rear portion of cabin which remained
relatively intact.
The aft flight attendants escaped unaided because their restraint systems did
not fail. They sustained fractures, contusions, and abrasions especially over
the pelvic area where their seatbelts restrained them.
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ACCIDENT #I-25 (cont'd)
The fire departments rapid response (6 minutes) prevented fatal burns to 9
passengers, some of whom were found lying in pools of fuel. Each of the
surviving passengers sustained burns which varied from first to third degree
over 30 to 70 percent of the body, The two forward flight attendents died of
multiple extreme impact injuries.
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ACCIDENT #2-I DENVER, COLO. : DC-8 : 7-11-61
PASSENGERS & CREW
T N/M S F
122 72 33
I.T. FIRE
17
The aircraft made a normal touchdown. The airplane veered off the runway to
the right. Both main landing gears were sheared off and the aircraft slid on
its belly across several hundred feet of open ground.
The aircraft came to a sudden halt when it struck a truck at the edge of an 46
cm (18 inch) concrete abutment. No. 4 engine tore free at impact and tumbled
to a point about 18 m (60 feet) forward of the right wing.
Flames followed a path of spilled fuel from the engine to the aircraft and
soon the right side of the fuselage was enveloped by a ground-fuel fire.
Smoke from the fire evaded the cabin through opened right window exits.
The No. 2 engine tore free and lay crushed under the left wing. Fire
developed, due to fuel spill, at the fuselage left side and prevented the use
of the left window exits. This fire was of limited extent for the first 5
minutes after the aircraft stopped.
The deceleration forces were mild until the aircraft struck the taxiway.
During evacuation, the principal environmental hazard was smoke. The chimney
effect drew smoke thru the right window exit and out the aft galley door. The
smoke concentration was heaviest in the aft cabin.
Fire invaded the cabin through the right window exits after 98 passengers had
escaped and 16 others were incapacitated by smoke.
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ACCIDENT #2-I (Cont'd)
Forward Section
The second officer left the cockpit and opened forward entry door. Second
officer and senior stewardess deployed the slide. First officer (escaped from
cockpit window) and held bottom of slide. Junior stewardess decided not to
open forward galley door. Senior stewardess helped several passengers thru
right window exits. Left window exits were not opened due to wing fire.
Second officer re-entered the aircraft. Breathing was difficult. He led
several stragglers to the forward door.
Second Class
The junior stewardess did not attempt to open the rear boarding door. It was
blocked with cabin debris. Deformation of the floor due to impact with the
truck would have prevented its use in any case.
The senior stewardess opened the aft galley door on the right side. Slide was
inflated after slight delay. The senior stewardness and passenger exited
aircraft and aided passengers descending the slide.
The junior stewardess assisted passengers just inside the galley door. About
20 persons used the slide until it was destroyed by fire.
The evacuation slowed due to the hesistation of many passengers to jump 2 m
(6 1/2 feet) to the ground.
After a warning that the aircraft was going to explode, the junior stewardess
jumped to the ground. From 15 m (50 feet) away she turned and saw _ or 6 more
passengers exit.
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ACCIDENT #2-I (cont'd)
Passenger evacuation record
forward boarding door 32
right overwing exits 26
aft galley service door 4(]
TOTAL 98
Evacuation was completed 3 to 5 minutes after the aircraft came to a halt.
The first fire equipment arrived just after the evacuation was complete.
Survivor Injuries
First Class:
All 38 first class passengers survived.
Only 7 had serious injuries.
First degree burns of face and hands were common.
No smoke inhalation injury.
Most burns occurred outside the A/C.
Window exits produced more injury than main door exits.
Second Class
44 out of 61 passengers survived.
19 were treated for smoke inhalation.
16 were treated for burns.
Most of the fatalities were at the end of the line going aft.
impact trauma were noted in the fatalities.
No signs of
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ACCIDENT #2-17 TORONTO, CANADA : DC-8-63: 7-5-70
PASSENGERS & CREW
T F
109
N/M S
0 0
I.T.
0
FIRE
109
Aircraft made a hard landing. The aircraft bounced back into the air. The
No. 4 engine was shed. The pilot attempted to go around and climbed to 914 m
(3000 feet). Explosion occurred in the right wing tank. Right wing and No. 3
engine separated from A/C. The aircraft crashed and was non-survivable.
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ACCIDENT 2-18 ST. THOMAS, V.I. : B727 : 12-28-70
PASSENGERS & CREW
T N/M S
55 42 11
I°T.
L •
0
FIRE
Approach was normal.
Touchdown was followed by a rebound 15 m (50 ft) above runway. Aircraft
touchdown very hard & aircraft became airborne again aircraft touched down for
3rd & last time.
Right wing tip settled to the runway. Aircraft veered off the runway and
continued parallel to runway. Aircraft went thru a chain]ink fence. Landing
gear and right wing tip struck concrete sidewalk, aircraft passed over
sidewalk and crashed into a truck. Aircraft continued up incline of a hill
and began to break apart as it stopped 91 m (300 ft) beyond the runway.
Explosion occurred in the left wing root followed by a small fire in same area.
Passenger evacuation began. 46 passengers and all the crew escaped the A/C.
The fire became intolerable. The fuselage had broken into 3 sections.
Engines I & 3 were intact and in place. Engine 2 was found under the
empennage. Engine fuel lines were intact. Nos. 2 & 3 valves were intact and
open.
One fatality was trapped by debris between 2 seats in Row 22. The other
fatality was found on the ground in the area of the aft fuselage break.
Forward Section
The galley door was opened by two flight attendants and the slide was
inflated. 12 occupants escaped thru the galley door.
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Center Section
The four overwing emergency exits were located here.
escaped thru the aft fuselage break.
All 19 passengers
Aft Section
12 evacuees escaped thru the fuselage break. 10 evacuees used the slide at
the aft main door. The two passenger fatalities were located here. The aft
main door was opened by the cabin attendant and two passengers with
difficulty. The aft galley door was not used.
Seat Failures
There were 8 known passenger seat failures. Only one of these seat frames was
found. All the legs of the seat were fractured. The entire seat showed a
lateral deformation to the left. They were designed for
9 g (FwdS
2 g(Up)
"_.5 g (Side)
4.5 g (Down)
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ACCIDENT 2-19 JFK : DC8-61 : 6-23-73
PASSENGERS & CREW
T S
128
N/M
120 8
I°T.
0
F
FIRE
0
Aircraft was on a flare just before touchdown. Spoilers were inadvertantly
deployed. Aircraft struck the runway, tail first and 6 m (20 feet) short of
runway. Aircraft was damaged substantially. The No. I engine separated from
the aircraft. A fire ignited in the No. 1 engine pylon. The fire was fed by
a ruptured fuel line. The crash truck arrived 1 minute after the crash. The
fire was extinguished with foam 30 seconds later.
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kCCII3_:NF 3-21 LAX : B7(37 : 1-16-74
65
PASSENGERS & CREW
N/M S
J
63 2
F
I .T. FIRE
0 0
The nose ]andinq gear collapsed on touchdown. The aircraft vertical
acceleration measured +4.5 g. The ignition source was the friction generated
between the nose wheel tires and the runway surface. Two fractured nose wheel
steering hydraulic lines fueled this fire with hydraulic fluid.
F1refighting personnel were unable to place the extinguishing agent directly
on the source of the fire. Only evacuation injuries occurred.
All four cabin doors and four overwing emergency exits were opened.
Fire Department arrived on the scene 6 minutes after the accident.
coming from all 3 exits and the open cockpit windows.
The L.A.
Smoke was
The fire had erupted thru the entire fuselage. The fire was under control in
25 minutes.
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ACCIDENF 2-24 KETCHIKAN, ALAS. : 8727 : 4-5-76
PASSENGERS & CREW
T N/M S F
5O 38 II
I.T. FIRE
The aircraft overran the runway. The left wing hit the antenna support
structure. The aircraft then struck large rocks and tree stumps. Fuselage
broke into three sections. One break at the wing L/E and one break at the
wing T/E. The left wing remained attached to the fuselage. The riqht wing
separated from the fuselage. The nose and main gears separated from their
attachments. No. 1 engine separated. No. 2 and No. 3 engines remained
attached.
Fire erupted on impact.
aft of the wing.
Flames were concentrated primarily in the cabin and
The cabin sustained multiple fractures to legs and ribs.
The first officer sustained skull, leg, rib and spinal fractures.
The second officer sustained multiple spinal and rib fracture.
Flight attendant in seat 6C sustained leg and abdominal bruises.
Flight attendant in seat 8C sustained cervical strain and rib fracture.
Flight attendant in seat 22C sustained fuel burns to his skin.
Flight attendant in seat 22D sustained fuel irritation to right eye and singed
hair.
lO occupants evacuated the main cabin door.
6 occupants exited holes in the cabin.
The remaining passengers evacuated two overwing exits.
The cockpit crew was trapped in cockpit.
16 seats failed.
Seat legs showed evidence of compression buckling.
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ACCIDENT 2-25 ST. THOMAS, V.I. : B727 : 4-27-76
PASSENGERS & CREW
T N/M
88 32 19
I.T.
18
FIRE
19
*estimated
(severe
impact &
severe
fire &
smoke)
Aircraft overran the runway. Aircraft struck electronic equipment support
structure. Aircraft struck a portion of the chain link perimeter-fence.
The right wing tip struck an embankment. The outboard portion of the right
wing was torn from the aircraft. The fire erupted immediately after the right
wing struck the embankment. The fire emanated from the rupture in the right
wing near the fuselage and was fed by aircraft fuel.
The aircraft impacted several automobiles.
gasoline station against a rum warehouse.
The aircraft came to rest in a
The fuselage broke into three parts during the impact. Black smoke and
intense fire penetrated forward and center sections of the broken fuselage as
the aircraft slid to a stop.
The first crash vehicle arrived on the scene about 2 minutes after the
accident. It fought the fire from a distance of 49 m (160 feet) due to
approach and equipment difficulties.
The surviving occupants escaped through fuselage breaks and overwing emergency
exits on the left side of the fuselage within I to 1 I/2 minutes after the
aircraft came to a stop.
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ACCIDENT 2-25 (Con't
The three flight crew members escaped thru the first officer's sliding
window. Several passenger seats broke loose from their mounts.
Two survivors stated that smoke in the cabin was immediate and affected their
ability to breathe almost before they could get out of their seats. It is
estimated that passengers could live for no more than 1 minute in the wreckage.
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ACCIDENT 2-26 N. NEWHOPE, GA : DC-9-31 : 4-4-77
PASSENGERS & CREW
T N/M S F
85 22
I,T.
38
FIRE
24
The aircraft outboard left wing contacted two trees. About 1.3 km (.8 miles)
later, left wing again contacted a tree. The left and right wings continued
to strike trees and utility poles on both sides of the highway. The left main
gear contacted the highway. The outer left wing struck an embankment and
aircraft veered left off the highway, The aircraft struck road signs, utility
poles, fences, trees schrubs, gasoline pumps, five automobiles and a truck.
Total wreckage was 579 m (1900 ft.) long and 90 m (295 ft.) wide. The
aircraft struck the ground 6 times before it came to rest, The fuselage broke
into five major sections. The fourth section contained the wings. The fifth
section contained the engine pylons. The first, second and third sections
were forward of the wings and were not damaged by fire, The fourth and fifth
ifuselage sections had substantial fire damage.
In the fifth section, after the first or second bounce after tile aircraft hit
the ground, a fireball erupted and traveled rearward along the ceiling. The
fireball extended downward from the ceiling to the tops of the passenger seats
and some passengers were on fire before the A/C stopped, Four of the five
survivors were ejected with their seats during the impacts. All of these
survivors were burned seriously.
In the fourth section, the survivors said that smoke, fire debris and bodies
hampered their escape. The survivors were severely burned.
In the third section (just forward of the wings L/E), the forward seated
passengers received extensive impact trauma. Two passengers seated in the row
nearest the wings L/E received extensive second degree burns. Fire erupted
during the impacts. 7B
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ACCIDENT 2-26 (cont'd)
Twenty passengers died of burns and smoke inhalation. Thirty-one passengers
died of extensive traumatic injuries (mostly crushing of the torso and head).
Nine passengers died of combined trauma with burning or smoke inhalation.
Seat failures contributed sustantially to impact trauma.
The feet of a number of survivors were cut and some were burned during the
evacuation. The flight attendants had evoked this standard crash preparation.
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ACCIDENT 3-I
REJECTED TAKEOFF, AIRCRAFT
NEVER LEFT THE GROUND
(Post Crash Fire)
Boeing 707, N769TW
Rome, Italy 11/23/64
Ref. Italian Ministry
of Civil Transportation
DESCRIPTION
During takeoff roll, No. 4 engine EPR dropped to zero and N2 surged
slightly. In addition No. 2 engine reverse light came on, The captain
aborted the takeoff. The aircraft veered to the right. Upon crossing a
taxiway the No. 4 engine contacted a pavement steam roller and caught on fire
and subsequently exploded.
WEATHER AND TIME
The time of the accident was approximately 13.08 local time.
FIRE
Fire was very intense on the right of the aircraft.
FIRE DYNAMICS
Cause of the fire was due to fuel escaping from the air vent at the end of the
right wing, and breaks in the fuel lines of the No. 4 engine at the time it
collided with the steamroller. The explosion of several fuel tanks, the most
violent of which occurred about 20 seconds after the aircraft came to a stop,
and the extremely rapid spread of a fire of enormous size, caused the almost
instantaneous death of the passengers remaining aboard or on the ground in the
immediate vicinity of the aircraft.
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FIRE DYNAMICS (Cont'd)
Some parts of the No. 4 engine, the left front wheel, and other fragments of
the structure were found along a strip between the position of the steam
roller and that of the main body of the wreck. Immediately upon the
aircraft's stopping, the fire and the subsequent explosions destroyed and
consumed the central portion of the fuselage and the wings. Following the
explosion of the No. 3 engine and central fuel tanks, numerous fragments of
these tanks were hurled into the surrounding area.
Examination of the fuel tank indicated that the right sector of the overall
fuel system burst as a result of an internal explosion, which caused the aft
spar to bend under compression. The entire forward part was carried away by
the explosion. The boost pump for the left portion of the central fuel tank
was totally destroyed by fire.
The feedlines to the No. 3 engine were bent and twisted by the heat all along
the section to the fuel pump, where there was one broken connection.
PASSENGERS AND CREW
Total Fatalities Severe None/Minor Fire Fatalities
73 48 13 12 48
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ACCIDENT 3-3
REJECTED TAKEOFF, AIRCRAFT
NEVER LEFT THE GROUND
(Post Crash Fire)
Boeing, 707, N742TW
DESCRIPTION
APPENDIX B
Er|anger, Kentucky 1116167
Ref. NTSB File No. 1-0029
I CAO I07-AN/81
TWL Fit. 159 crashed while attempting to abort a takeoff. The first officer
of the flight heard a loud report from the right side of the aircraft during
the takeoff roll. He concluded that his aircraft had struck a Delta Airline
DC-9 which was mired adjacent to the runway and attempted to ahort the
takeoff. The aircraft was extensively damaged by the ground slide and fire.
WEATHER AND TIME
The accident occurred at approximately 1841 E.S.T. The IVeather Bureau
reported 24 km (15 miles) visibility, temperature I° C (34° F) dew point
-70 C (190 F), wind 190°/5 kt.
FIRE
Ground fire occurred in the area of the right wing separation and the No. 3
and 4 engines. This was a survivable accident, although one of the eleven
injured died four days after the accident. The death was not a result of fire
after impact.
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FIRE DYNAMICS
The aircraft overran the runway and became airborne momentarily. It contacted
the ground approximately 20 m (67 feet) further down the embarkment, the
landing gear sheared, and the nose wheel was displaced rearward which forced
the cabin floor upward approximately 38 cm (15 inches). During a ground
slide, the fuselage upper structure ruptured just forward of the wing root,
and the right wing failed inboard of the No. 4 engine. Engines Nos. I and 2
partial|y separated and engine No. 3 separated from the wing structure. The
right wing area surrounding the break was damaged by ground fire. The fuel
shutoff valves were closed by the flight engineer before he departed the
aircraft.
PASSENGERS AND CREW
Total Fatalities Severe None/Minor Fire Fatalities
36 i 1 34 I
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ACCIDENT NO. 3-7
REJECTED TAKEOFF, AIRBORNE AND
TRIED TO LAND ON REMAINING RUNWAY
(No post crash fire)
Sioux City, lowa 12-27-68
Ref. NTSB File 1-0039
DC-9-15, N974A
DESCRIPTION
An Ozark Air Line Flt. 982 crashed while taking off from Sioux City Airport.
The aircraft began its takeoff with the flight crew aware that ice was on the
wings. As the landing gear began to retract, the aircraft rolled abruptly and
violently to the right to an angle of bank estimated by the flight crew to
have reached 90o . After maneuvering the airplane until the right wing came
up, the captain discontinued the takeoff. He succeeded in lewling the winqs
prior to final ground contact. The aircraft came to rest in a grove of trees
360 m (1181 feet) beyond the departure end of the runway.
WEATHER AND TIME
The accident occurred at 071 C.S.T. The surface weather was overcast with
visibility of 4.8 km (3 miles), the temperature at -6 o C (22°F), dew point
was -7 o C (20°F), and wing from 20° at 13 knots.
FIRE
There was no fire.
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FIRE DYNAMICS
The aircraft was damaged beyond economical repair by ground impact and
subsequent slide through trees. The wings were torn and crumpled
extensively. The wing fuel cells were ruptured. The leftwing tip and tip
extension were separated from the wing. Wreckage examination confirmed that
the fuel tanks were ruptured prior to the time the aircraft came to rest. An
estimated 8328 liters (2200 gallons) of fuel emptied from the ruptured fuel
tanks and a heavy fuel odor permeated the area around the fuselaqe.
Absorption of the fuel by the 56 cm (22 inches) of snow on the qrnund and
reduced vaporization as a result of the -6 o C (22°F) temperature were
considered major reasons for the absence of fire. The left engine which
continued to run, could have provided the ignition source.
PASSENGERS AND CREW
Total Fatalities Severe None/Minor Fire Fatalities
68 0 3 65 0
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ACCIDENT NO. 3-8
REJECTED TAKEOFF, AIRBORNE AND
TRY TU LAND ON REMAINING RUNWAY
(Post crash fire) (Training flight)
Moses Lake, Washinqton
Ref. NTSB AAR-80-11
6-?4-6_
Convair 880
DESCRIPTION
Japan Air Line Training Flt. 90 crashed while executing a takeoff. Shortly
after lift-off, the flight instructor reduced power on No. zt enqine to check
the trainee's emergency procedures, and the aircraft he(fan to yaw to the
right. This yaw continued until the right wing went down and the No. 4 enqine
pod made contact with the runway. The aircraft slid off the runway. The
aircraft slid off the runway into a rotJgh terrain, hreakinq up and hurstinq
into flames.
WEATHER AND TIME
Weather observations recorded by control tower at the time of the acciHent
were made at 1555 and 1610. Both recorded visibility 105 km (_ statute
miles); temperature 230 C (74°F), dew point 3° C (38°F). The 1555
observation showed the wind from 250 o at 15 knots and the 1610 observation
showed the wind from 280 o at 10 knots.
FIRE
Evidence of ground fire was found approximately 518 m (1700 feet) north of
where the aircraft left the runway and beyond the point where disintegration
of the aircraft began. Upon coming to rest, the win qs and the fusela,qe
erupted in flame. The fuselage (except for the empennage) and winqs were
almost completely consumed hy fire.
84
APPENDIX B
i-- [P,L [JY;_,-\,4i Cg
I I_e fusclage separated at the trailing edge of the wings. The aircraft was
completely destroyed by fire except the components scattered along tlle
wreckage patio.
A11 engines were separated during the ground slide. They all were subjected
to vari,}us degrees of fire damage. The fuel valves were determined to be in
normal takeoff positions. No evidence of a pre-impact malfunction or failure
,_ the engine were found.
PASSE,_GERS b CREWS
[otal Fatalities Severe None/Minor Fire Fatalities
5 3 2 0 3
No photos
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ACCIDENT NO. 3-9
REJECTED TAKEOFF, AIRCRAFT
NEVER LEFT THE GROUND
(Post crash f_re)
Stockton, Calif. 10-16-69
Ref. NTSB File No. 1-0058
DC-8-63F, N8634
DESCRIPTION
A SeaboarJ World Airline training flight overran the departure end of the
runway and struck the roadway. The aircraft came to rest 241 m (792 feet)
beyond the ,_nd of the runway and subsequently was destroyed hy fire. This
occurred when the captain rejected the takeoff during a touch and go maneuver.
WEATHER AND TIME
The accident occurred at 1545 P.D.T. The weather report at that time showed a
visibility of 32 km (20 miles), wind 310 ° at 12 knots, temperature 21o C
(70°F), dew point 12°C (53°F).
FIRE
The post crash fire originated in the area of the No. 2 enqine and the pylon
separated from the left wing, gutting most of the aircraft.
FIRE DYNAMICS
When the aircraft struck the roadway, the left main nose landing gear
collapsed. The aircraft overran slightly left of the runway centerline.
There was substantial damage to the aircraft's structure. The left wing was
destroyed by fire from the No. I engine inboard to the fuselage. There was
extensive damage in the right wing root and the inboard leading edge of the
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FIRE DYNAMICS (Cont'd)
tank between the fuselage and the No. 3 engine was consumed by fire. No. 2
Pngine and its pylon separated. No. I, 3, and 4 fuel control units were in
off position; No. 2 engine fuel control was in an intermediate position
between off and on. No. I and No. 2 engine nacelles contacted the terrain.
PASSENGERS AND CREW
Total Fatalities Severe None/Minor Fire Fatalities
5 0 0 5 0
8?
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ACCIDENT NO. 3-12
REJECTED TAKEOFF, AIRBORNE AND
TRIED TO LAND ON REMAINING
RUNWAY
(no post crash fire)
Philadelphia, Penn. 7/Ig/70
Ref. ICAO Circular 118-AN/88
& NTSB AAR-72-g
Boeing 737-222, N-9005U
DESCRIPTION
United Air Line Flt. 611 crashed shortly after taking off from the
Philadelphia International Airport. After taking off, the crew heard a loud
explosion, following which the aircraft veered right. The captain then
decided to land on the remaining runway. The aircraft touched down hard on
the departure runway and continued off the end and across a hlast pad.
WEATHER AND TIME
Weather conditions are not considered to have been a factor in this accident.
The temperature was 29o C (84°F), dew point 210 C (69°F), wind 150o
12 knot, and visibility 16 km (10 miles).
F IRE
There was no evidence of fire on any part of the aircraft or on the qround in
the impact area.
FIRE DYNAMICS
Part of the aircraft landed in a pond. The left wing sustained major
structural damage. The forward trunnion attach Fitting of the left landinq
gear had been fractured resulting in fuel leakage. The lower fuselaae
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FIRE DYNAMICS (Cont'd)
structure was substantially damaged. The right main landinq qear was
separated from the aircraft. The left main landinq gear was attached to th,_
aircraft hy the outboard walking beam attachment.
The nose landing gear had folded aft and was lodged in the electronic and
electrical compartment of the fuselage.
The No. I engine was separated from the pylnn and lodged heneath the left
wir_g. The engine was deflected in an outhoard diretion of apprnximately 45 o
and had rotated approximately 90° , such that the hottom of the enqine was
facing towards the left wing tip. All engine accessories were intact and
attached except for a separated fuel filter housinq assemhly.
PASSENGERS AND CREW
Total Fatalities Severe None/Minor Fire Fatalities
61 0 I 60 0
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ACCIDENT NO. 3-14
REJECTED TAKEOFF, AIRCRAFT
NEVER LEFT THE GROUND
(Post crash fire)
Anchorage, Alaska
Ref. NTSB AAR- 72-12
DC-8-63F, N4909C
11-27-70
DESCRIPTION
Capitol International Airways Flt. C2C3/26 crashed and burned following an
unsuccessful takeoff attempt. The aircraft failed to become airborne during
the takeoff run and overran the end of the runway. It continued along the
ground and struck a low wooden barrier, the instrument landing structure, and
a 3.7 m (12 foot) deep drainage ditch before coming to a stop. The aircraft
was destroyed in the intense ground fire which developed subsequent to the
crash.
WEATHER & TIME
The runway was mostly covered with ice with occasional dry spots. A 1707
weather observation reported a visibility of 8 km (5 miles), temperature -40
C (24°F), dew point -5o C (23°F), wind 600/6 knots.
FIRE
The interior of the fuselage, forward of the RR. pressure bulkhead was totally
gutted by fire. The major portion of the left wing and the inboard end of the
right wing were also consumed by fire. The forward cockpit area and the aft
fuselage was not destroyed. Several minutes after the accident occurred, two
fairly large explosions were observed emanating from the left side of the
aircraft.
FIRE DYNAMICS
First impact was with the ILS structure at which point structural damage was
incurred in the left wing area. Fire broke out on the left side of the
aircraft. The second impact was the most severe and was felt as the aircraft
traversed the 3.7 m (12 ft.) deep drainage ditch. This initiated gross
structural breakup. The aft section of the cabin broke open and the right
Qn
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FIRE DYNAMICS (Cont'd)
wing tore loose, spilling fuel. A large fire then erupted on the right side
of the aircraft. Some passengers removed seat belts and moved away from the
Fire.
The third (final) jolt injured some of these passengers. This jolt occurred
when the aircraft came to a stop.
A narrow trail of ground fire originated at the far edge of the ditch between
the depressions left by the right hand engines and continued to the main
wreckage site which was 213 m (700 ft.) east of the drainage ditch. A similar
trail of ground fire originated on the left side of the aircraft approximately
91 m (300 ft.) east of the ditch and continued to the main wreckage area
Thousands of liters (gallons) of raw fuel formed a big pool 15 to 20 cm (6 to
8) inches deep around the aircraft.
Except for the forward galley door, which was blocked by galley equipment, all
exits in the forward part of the cabin were open and used for evacuation.
Three of the four over-wing exits were also opened and being used.
Most fatalities were seated in the aft cabin between rows 26 and 35 just aft
of the wing. The aft 2 jet escape doors (row 33) were closed and jammed.
However, there was a break in the fuselage at row 36 through which several
survivors exited. The other survisors from the aft cabin and all the
survivors from the forward cabin areas used the over wing exits and the
forward entry door. The fatally injured flight attendant was seated at row 33
on the aisle seat near the left side escape door.
The remaining survivors from the aft cabin area exited through the break in
the fuselage or through the aft galley exit which could only be partially
opened.
PASSENGERS & CREW
Total Fatalities Severe None/Minor Fire Fatalities
229 47 49 gl 133 47
APPENDIXB
ACCIDENT NO. 3-17
REJECTED TAKEOFF, AIRBORNE AND
TRIED TO LAND ON REMAINING
RUNWAY
(Post crash fire)
Moscow, USSR 11-28-72
Ref. USSR Ministry of
Aviation and JAL
Report
DC-8-62
DESCRIPTION
During climb after aircraft began takeoff roll, it began to descend sharply,
crashed and was subsequently destroyed by impact and post crash fire.
WEATHER AND TIME
The weather is described as cloudy sky, visibility of 4500 m, wind 210 ° at 3
meters per second, and temperature -5°C with relative humidity of 96%.
FIRE
The aircraft was engulfed in fire in the process of its destruction after
touching the ground. As a result of the fire, a considerable part of the
aircraft was burned.
FIRE DYNAMICS
The parts of the aircraft involved in the initial impact were: the tail part,
L/H landing gear bogie, No. I engine, No. 2 engine and L/H wing tip. The fire
on the aircraft appeared to be a result of ignition of fuel which was pouring
out of tanks.
PASSENGERS AND CREW
Total Fatalities Severe None/Minor Fire Fatalities
76 61 15 0 ?
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ACCIDENTNO. 3-18
COLLISION O'Hare International Airport 12/20/72
Chicago, Illinois
(Post crash fire)
DC-9-31, N954N
Ref. NTSB-AAR-73-15
GENERAL DESCRIPTION
Delta Airline Flt. 954, CV-880 collided with a North Central Airline Flt. 575
on the runway. The DC-9 was destroyed by the impact and fire after attempting
a quick takeoff to avoid the crash.
WEATHER AND TIME
The weather at O'Hare airport at the time of the accident was reported as sky
obscured, with visibility of 0.4 km (I/4 mile) in the fog. Time was 1800:08.7.
FIRE
Fire broke out almost immediately, and smoke developed very rapidly in the
DC-9 after it came to a stop. The fuselage from FS 160 to FS 900 was gutted
by fire. The e_ennage was intact with evidence of fire damage on the
vertical and horizontal stabilizers. There was no fire on the CV-880.
FIRE DYNAMICS
DC-9: The right main landing gear and two sections of the right leading edge
flap separated from the aircraft. The nose gear and left main gear had failed
rearward. Engine disclosed no evidence of abnormal operation or malfunction.
The No. I (left) emergency fuel shutoff valve was nearly closed, and No. 2
engine emergency shutoff valve was closed. The No. 1 engine was only slightly
damaged, but the No. 2 engine was damaged extensively by fire. A 46 cm
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FIRE DYNAMICS (Cont'd)
(18-inch) piece of a horizontal rib from the CV-880 vertical stabilizer was
lodged against the inlet vanes of the No. 2 engine. When the plane touched
down, the remaining landing gear collapsed and the aircraft skidded to a
stop. Fire was seen in the aft section of the aircraft. Nine of the I0
fatally injured passengers failed to escape from the aircraft. These
passengers received no traumatic injuries but succumbed instead to the effects
of smoke inhalation or burns, or both.
PASSENGERS AND CREW
Total Fatalities Severe None/Minor Fire Fatalities
45 10 9 26 i0
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ACCIDENT NO. 3-19
REJECTED TAKEOFF, AIRCRAFT
NEVER LEFT THE GROUND
(Post crash fire)
Bangor, Maine
Ref. NTSB AAR-74-1
File #I-0015
6-20-73
DC-8-63, N863F
DESCRIPTION
ONA Flt. 4655 blew two landing gear tires while taxiing for takeoff.
captain then rejected the takeoff and brought the aircraft to a stop.
The
FIRE
Fire broke out in the area of the right main landing gear and severly damaged
the right main landing gear system, the right wing, and the right side of the
fuselage. The right inboard wing panel and flap assembly were heavily damaged
by fire and flying debris. Fire also damaged a small area on the right side
of the fuselage near the right wing root.
FIRE DYNAMICS
The fire was ignited by the friction between the metal wheels and the runway
pavement. The fire started during the takeoff roll and burned for
approximately 5 minutes before it was extinguished.
PASSENGERS AND CREW
Total Fatalities Severe None/Minor Fire Fatalities
261 0 3 258 0
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ACCIDENT NO. 3-21
REJECTED TAKEOFF, AIRCRAFT
NEVER LEFT THE GROUND
(Post crash fire)
Jamaica, New York
Ref. NTSB AAR-76-19
DC-I0-30, N1032F
11-12-75
DESCRIPTION
ONA Airways Fit. 032 crashed while attempting to take off. During the takeoff
roll, the aircraft struck many sea gulls, and the takeoff was rejected. As
the aircraft decelerated, the No. 3 engine disintegrated and caught fire. The
NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the disintegration
and subsequent fire in the No. 3 engine when it ingested a large number of sea
gulls.
WEATHER AND TIME
The time of the accident was 1310 E.S.T. The weather information was:
visibility 24 km (15 miles), wind 160° at 8 knots, 3048 m (10000 feet)
overcast. (Runway surface was wet).
FIRE
After the birds were ingested and the No. 3 engine had disintegrated, fire
erupted on the right side of the aircraft. Occupants in the aircraft who were
able to see the No. 3 engine agreed that fire erupted on the right wing as
soon as the engine disintegrated and separated. The fire was not extinguished
until about 36 hours after the accident.
There wer, many separated aircraft parts scattered on the runway. These parts
consistec f pieces of the No. 3 engine's compressor, fan module, fan thrust
reverser and cowling; the main landing gear wheels and tires, and the right,
aft centerline landing gear door.
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FIRE DYNAMICS
Parts of the No. 3 engine found on the runway were: the lower HPC stator case
assembly, the HPC stage 1 and stage 2 discs, the complete fan module, and
miscellaneous engine parts including the engine fuel feed line.
The Safety Board concludes that the fire erupted as the engine separated. The
most probable ignition source was the raw fuel which released from the main
fuel line onto the hot engine at a rate of 567 to 606 liters (150 to 160
gallons) per minute.
As the aircraft was turned onto taxiway 2, the fire continued to burn in the
area of the No. 3 engine. After the failure of the right main landing gear,
structural loads were transferred to the right wing when the wing hit the
ground.
This transfer resulted in an overload failure of the right rear spar and skin
at wing station 622 in the area of the No. 3 fuel tank. Fuel released from
the wing tank fracture area flowed down to, and pooled against, the fuselage,
and continued to feed the fire at the No. 3 pylon location.
Simultaneously with the right main landing gear and wing failures, the No. 3
pylon structure also hit the ground and was displaced inboard, which allowed
the remaining parts of the No. 3 engine to penetrate the lower wing skin at
the No. 2 fuel tank location; this penetration allowed additional fuel to be
added to the fire. Fire fighters were not able to extinguish the fire for
about 36 hours because of the fuel accumulation in the storm drain.
PASSENGERS & CREW
Total Fatalities Severe None/Minor Fire Fatalities
139 0 2 137 0
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ACCIDENT NO. 3-23
REJECTED TAKEOFF, AIRCRAFT
NEVER LEFT THE GROUND
(Post crash fire)
Denver, Colorado
Ref. NTSB AAR-77-10
DC-9-14, N9104
11-16-76
DESCRIPTION
Texas International Fit. 987 crashed after rejecting a takeoff. The takeoff
was rejected after the aircraft had rotated for takeoff. When the pilot was
unable to stop the aircraft within the confines of the runway, it over-ran the
runway, traversed drainage ditches, struck approach stanchions, and stopped.
(False stall warning)
WEATHER & TIME
The weather was clear, wind from 130° at 7 knots, and the temperature was
4° C (4O°F). The time of the accident was approximately 1729.
FIRE: The aircraft was damaged severly by impact and fire.
FIRE DYNAMICS
Fire erupted on the left side of the aircraft after the left main landing gear
traversed the ditch and severed the left main landing gear's attaching
structure on the left main fuel tank's gear bulkhead. Fuel escaped from this
tank, burned, and caused massive damage to the left side of the fuselage and
inboard section of the left wing. The cabin interior was damaged heavily
throughout by smoke and soot. The fire burned through the left side in the
area of the left wing root. The left wing was on the ground; the wing tip
separated.
PASSENGERS AND CREW
Total Fatalities Severe None/Minor Fire Fatalities
86 0 2 84 0
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ACCIDENT NO. 3-24 & 3-25
COLLISION Tenerife, Canary Island 3-27-77
(Post crash fire)
B747, N736 & B747, PH-BUF
Ref. Unpublished NTSB report
& Arnmd Forces Institute
of Pathology
DESCRIPTION
PAA flight B150, a charter flight from L.A., collided with KLM flight 4805, a
charter flight from Amsterdam, on the runway while both were taxiing to prepare
for takeoff.
WEATHER & TIME
The accident occurred at approximately 1707. Visibility was reported to be
500 meters.
FIRE
Both aircraft caught on fire immediately. The PAA plane came to an immediate
stop but the KLM flight travelled an additional 457 meters. All occupants of
the KLM airplane received fatal injuries.
In general, all the KLM bodies were burned and all but approxmiately 10
fatalities from the PAA aircraft were burned.
The fire was not extinguished until 330 on March 28, 1977.
both aircraft by fire was very complete.
Destruction of
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FIRE DYNAMICS
The KLM contacted the PAA initially at a 30 to 40 degree angle with its engine
at the upper lounge area. The right wing gear and body then sheared off near
the PAA right wing root area. The No. 3 engine broke free and remained within
the center section of the PAA aircraft. The right wing of the PAA was
destroyed by the KLM body, The fuselage of the KLM then travelled through the
PAA aft fuselage, destroying this section and shearing off the empennage.
Fire enveloped the entire KLM aircraft immediately, Fire was confined in the
PAA aircraft to the right wing and aft fuselage. The fire later progressed to
the forward fuselage. A flight attendant who escaped the wreckage noted that
the left outboard engine was running and saw fire behind the left wing. She
also noted several small explosions.
Two principal areas where thermal fatalities occurred corresponded to the
passage of the KLM center fuselage section and areas on either side of the No.
I engine. Fuel probably spilled from the center wing and left wing tank of
the KLM and started the initial fires in these areas.
Engines #3 & #4 of PAA separated, Landing gears of KLM separated,
PASSENGERS AND CREW
Total Fatalities Severe None/Minor
KLM 248 248 0 0
PAA 396 326 34 36
Fire Fatalities
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ACCIDENT NO. 3-27
REJECTED TAKEOFF, AIRCRAFT
NEVER LEFT THE GROUND
(Post crash fire)
Los Angeles, Calif.
Ref. NTSB-AAR-79-1
DC-ID-IO, N68045
3-1-78
DESCRIPTION
Continental Air Lines Fit. 603 overrun the runway
takeoff. Three tires failed during the takeoff roll.
stop.
following a rejected
The aircraft slid to a
WEATHER & TIME
Weather report indicated a visibility for 3 miles in rain, temperature 150 C
(59°F), dew point 150 C (59°F), wind 140° at 11 knots gusting to 20
knots. The time of the accident was 0925 P.S.T. (The runway was wet).
FIRE
According to passenger statements, fire erupted from the left side of the
aircraft before it came to a stop. The fire spread rapidly under the fuselage
and damaged t he inboard right wing and right engine cowl.
FIRE DYNAMICS
The No. 1 engine was damaged severely when the left main landing gear failed
and the left side of the aircraft dropped on the engine and left wing.
The left wing was damaged severly when the left main landing gear collapsed;
it caught on fire. The No. I engine and pylon assembly had separated and was
located just forward of the wing. The engine pod and pylon assembly was badly
burned. The fuel tank had not ruptured when the engine pylon separated.
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FIRE DYNAMICS (Cont'd)
The outboard flap had separated from the wing. The left wing leading edge had
been damaged by fire.
Slats Nos. 5 through 8 were burned on the surface and appeared to be
retracted. The slats were still attached to the wing. The lower wing tip
skin had broken through, rupturing the fuel tank near the tip. A section of
the rear spar web and vertical tang of the lower cap had broken loose at the
outboard end of the landing gear fitting, which created a 0.09 sq. m (I sq.ft)
hole in the aft wall of the left compartment of the No. 2 fuel tank.
A trapezoidal portion of the wing rear spar web (about I/3 sq. m) remained
attached to the landing support when the upper and lower auxiliary spar tore
off at the flap hinge fitting. This opened up the No. I fuel tank.
This was a survivable accident.
PASSENGER & CREW
Total Fatalities Severe None/Minor Fire Fatalities
200 2 31 167 2
APPENDIXB
ACCIDENT NO. 3-28
REJECTED TAKEOFF, AIRCRAFT
NEVER LEFT THE GROUND
(No post crash fire)
Toronto, Canada 6-26-78
Ref. H80002
CANADIAN AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT REVIEW BOARD
DC-9-32, 47197
DESCRIPTION
Air Canada Fit. 189 crashed during a rejected takeoff. The No. 3 tire failed
and rubber debris damaged the right main landing gear "down & locked" switch.
The right gear unsafe light came on in the flight deck. The aircraft failed
to stop within the confines of the runway. It continued beyond the overrun
area, over the edge of a ravine, and came to rest in the ravine.
WEATHER & TIME
The accident occured at 809 EDT. Weather observations were visibility 3.2 km
(2 miles) in fog, temperature 18°C, dew point 16°C, wind 140° at 7 knots.
FIRE DYNAMICS - The aircraft broke into three parts on impact, but there was
no fi re.
Impact forces had ruptured the left main fuel tank. MOT report states that
the auxiliary tank leaked fuel, however inspectors on the scene stated that
this was not correct. A large amount of fuel was spilled. Although there was
no fire, the areas were completed foamed due to fire danger.
PASSENGERS AND CREW
Total Fatalities Severe None/Minor Fi re Fatalities
107 2 46 59 0
1o3

APPENDIX C
CRASH CHARACTERISTICS AND ASSOCIATED INJURIES
This appendix contains three sets of tables (TABLES C-1, C-2, _ C-3), devoted
to the demonstration of a dependency of aircraft occupant injuries to some of
the characteristics of three types of accidents.
TABLE C-I
TABLE C-2
TABLE C-3
Approach Accidents
Landing Accidents
Takeoff Accidents
These tables list some 30 accident characteristics for 35 accidents which are
among the ones that have better descriptions. It is obvious that considerable
emphasis was and will be given to those accidents with large numbers of
fatalities as well as serious injuries.
The thirty accident characteristics of each table represent an initial effort
to organize the ingredients of an accident. The number of characteristics
could easily be expanded to include three times this number to produce a more
thorough listing. These characteristics were assembled into seven convenient
groups listed below.
A convenient method of describing an accident is by representing it as a
chronologically ordered series of events, especially since time is of the
essence during the evacuation period. Thus, four of the seven characteristics
groups are chronologically arranged. These are the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th
groups of the following list.
1. Passengers and Crew
2. Subsystems
3. Approach and Impact
4. Terrain and Aircraft Slide
5. Fire
6. Evacuation
7. Meteorological Information
Prece,Jingpageblank i
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APPENDIX D
AIRLINE TRANSPORT STATISTICS
This appendix contains world air transport statistics derived from IATA
(International Air Transport Association) and ICAO (International Civil Air
Organization) sources. The data includes international and domestic
operations for the year 1960 through to 1979. the ICAO organization produc_s
the more complete world data base.
The data recorded here pertains only to the following:
l) Total passengers carried per year
2) Total departures per year
3) Yearly world fleet totals.
Projections of these data were made for international and domestic operations
(in Tables D-I, D-2, D-3 and D-4) for the years 1980 up to 2005. Plots of these
data age given in Figures D-I, D-2 & D-3.
Basic Data
Ref. Aviation Week & Space Technology, September l, 1980.
1980 - 1994
1979
6100 new passenger jet aircraft
63% short & medium range aircraft
5803 passenger aircraft in 202 passenger airlines
of which 5032 were jet aircraft. (3900 or 68%
will be retired by 1994)
World traffic increase rates (passengers carried)
1980 5%
early 1980's 7% annually
early 1990's 6% annually
Preceding Page Blank 113
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Aircraft Revenue Departures & Numbers of Passengers
World Air Transport Operations (1975-1979)
ICAO - International and Domestic
ICAO
Yearly
Depart ures
Yearly
Percent ICAO
Change Pax
Percent
Change
1975 9672xi03
1976 9945xi03
1977 lO,136xlO 3
1978 lO,371xlO 3
1979 I0,680xi03
+0.7% I
+2.8%
+I.9%
+2.3%
+3.0%
+2.14%
435.8xi06 +2.8% _
475.1xi0 6 +9.0%
517.2xi06 +8.8%
581.OxlO 6 +12.3%
639.0xi06 +I0.0%
+8.6%
IATA IATA
Yearly Yearly
Departures PAX
1975 6258xi0 3 317.2x106
6 6463xi03 345.2xi06
7 6523xi03 373.0xi06
8 5892xi03 372.2xi06
9 5795xi0 3 389.2xi06
30,931xi0 3 1796.8xi06
ICAO Depart 50_804 = 1.642
IATA Depart 30,931
ICAO PAX = 2648.1
IATA PAX 1796.8
* 9672 =
1.007
435.8 =
1.028
9604xi03
423.9x106
= 1.474
1960
l
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1970
1
2
3
4
IATA
Yearly
Departures
4004x lO3
4062
4507
4715
5476
5873
6150
6191
6141
6547
6847
6425
ICAO
Yearly Yearly
PAX Departures
82.4x lO 6
187.5
95.0
I06.5
120.3
141.1
157.9
188.0
208. l
228.9
241.0
252.5
285.3
313.7
Yearly
PAX
121.5xi06
157.0
277.1
355.2
316.9 ,9604xi03 423.9xi03
1,474xIAT
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TABLE D-l IATA Versus ICAO
Numbers of Yearly Passengers
1960 - 1974
APPEND! X D
Aircraft Revenue Departures & Numbers of Passengers
World air Transport Operations (1985 - 2005)
ICAO - International & Domestic
1979
1980
1981
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1990
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2000
1
2
3
4
5
Percent
Increase
5%
7%
6.5%
6.0%
5.5%
5.0%
P
1.05 P
1.12 P
1.20 P
l .28 P
1.38 P
1.47 P
1.57 P
1.67 P
1.78 P
1.89 P
2.02 P
2.14 P
2.27 P
2.40 P
2.55 P
2.70 P
2.85 P
3.01 P
3.17 P
3.34 P
3.53 P
3.71 P
3.89 P
4.08 P
4.29 P
4.50 P
ICAO
Percent
Increase
3.0%
2.75%
2.5%
2.5%
Yearly
PAX
639x106
671
716
767
818
882
939
]003
1067
1137
1208
1291
1367
1451
1534
1629
1725
1821
1923
2026
2134
2256
2371
2486
2607
2741
2.0%
D
1.03 D
1.06"D
1.09
1.13
7.16
1.19
]. 227
l .26
1.29
1.33
1.36
1.40
1.43
] .4%
l .51.
1.54
I.57:
l.61
1.65"
l.68
1.72
1.76
1.79
1.83
1.86
2876xi06
ICAO
1.90
Yearly
Departures
I0.68xi06
1 l,OOxlO 6
II.32xi06
11.64xi06
12.07
72.39
12.71
13.03
13.46
13.78
14.20
14.52
14,95
15.27
}5.70
16.13
16.45
16.77
17.19
17.62
17.94
18.37
18.80
19.12
19.54
19.86
20.29xi06
TABL E D-2 PROJECTED YEARLY NUMBERS OF DEPARTURES AND PASSENGERS
WORLD AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS
1980 - 2005
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Aircraft Revenue Departures & Numbers of Passengers
Development of World Air Transport
ICAO - International & Domestic
IATA
Yearly
Departures
Percent
Change
Percent
Change
ICAO
Yearly
Departures
1960
1961
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1970
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1980
4004xi0 3
4062
4507
4715
5476
5873
6150
6191
6141
6547
6847
6425
6258
6463
6523
5892
5795
-1.4% I -5"65%1i
-9.9% I
-4•4% I !
-13.9%
-6.8% -6 •06%
-4.5% j
-0.7%
+0• 8% _
-6.2%
-4 •4% _ -• 10%_
+6.6%
+2.7%
-3.2% \
-0•9% }
+I0.7% +2.1%
+1.7%
\
-5.86_
I -2.43%
-. 10%I
-5.86%
P
i
-. 10%
1
+2.1%
.652 D
.693 D
.736 D
.781 D
.830 D
.882 D
.937 D
.995 D
•996 D
.997 D
•998 D
.999 D
D
6.306xi06
6.703
7.119
7.554
8.028
8.531
9.063
9.624
9.633
9.643
9.652
9.662
9.672xi06
9.945x 106
I0.136xi06
I0.371xi06
I0.68xi06
TABLE D-3
- Projected Yearly Numbers of Departures
World Air Transport Operations
1963 - 1979
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World Air Transport Operations (ICAO - Internat'l & Domestic)
Year
1960
1961
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1970
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Total
Yearly
PAX
Total
xlO 9
.12
.14
.15
.16
.20
.225
.25
.28
.305
.34
.35
.375
.39
.405
.43
.465
.51
.55
.59
.64
6.875
Yearly
Departure
Total
xlO 6
5.4
5.75
6.0
6.4
6.7
7.1
7.55
8.0
8.55
9.05
9.65
9.65
9.65
9.65
9.65
9.7
9.9
10.1
I0.4
10.7
169.55
Year
1986
7
8
9
1990
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2000
1
2
3
4
5
Yearly Yearly
PAX Departure
Total
x109
1.0
I.075
1.15
1.41
1.29
I.37
1.45
1.54
1.63
1.72
l.825
l.93
2.025
2.14
2.25
2.375
2.50
2.62
2.75
2.87
36.920
Total
xlO 6
13.1
13.45
13.8
14.2
14.5
14.9
15.3
15.65
16.0
16.45
16.8
17.2
17.6
18.0
18.4
18.8
19.1
19.6
19.9
20.25
333.00
World Fleet
Jet Prop
6300 520
6500 500
6700 460
6850 400
7000 390
7200 350
7400 320
7600 300
7800 270
7900 210
8100 190
8300 160
8500 140
8700 100
8820 60
9250 0
9640
10,050
10,500
10,900
Total
TABLE D-4 -
PAX 1986-2005
1960-1979
Summary of
World
Yearly Numbers of Departures
Air Transport Opertions
1960 - 2005
36.92xi09 =
6.875xi09
and Passengers
Total Depart ures 1986-2005
1960-1979
333.0xi06 :
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World Fleet - Present and Future
1979 5803 passenger aircraft in
(5032 (86.7%) jet aircraft)
( 771 (13.3%) prop aircraft)
202 airlines
1980-1994 6100 new passenger jet aircraft added to fleet
3900 passenger aircraft retired
Aircraft Retirement rate = 3900 = 260 aircraft per year
15
Jet addition rate = 6100 = 407 aircraft per year
15
1985 World Fleet
(1985-1979)
=(5803-260 (1985-1979)) .867 +
= 5031-1353 + 2442 = 6120 jet aircraft
=(5803-260 (1985-1979)) .133
= 772 - 207 = 565 prop aircraft
407
1990 World Fleet
= 6120-260 (1990-1985) .867 + 407 (1990-1985)
+6120-1127 + 2035 = 7028 jet aircraft
= 565-260 (1990-1985) .133
=565-173 = 392 prop aircraft
1995 World Fleet
= 7028-1127 + 2035 : 7936 jet aircraft
= 392-173 : 219 prop aircraft
2000 World Fleet
= 7936-1127 + 2035 = 8844 jet aircraft
= 219-173 = 46 prop aircraft
2005 World Fleet = 8844-1127 + 2035 : 9752 jet aircraft
= 46-173 = 0 prop aircraft
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